[wip] single runtime handling

config.development.yaml

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ security:
   jwt_refresh_expiration: 2592000 # 30 days
   encryption_key: test-encryption-key-32-chars-okay
   enable_auth: true
+  allow_self_registration: true
 
 # Packs directory (where pack action files are located)
 packs_base_dir: ./packs

config.test.yaml

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ security:
   jwt_refresh_expiration: 3600 # 1 hour
   encryption_key: test-encryption-key-32-chars-okay
   enable_auth: true
+  allow_self_registration: true
 
 # Test packs directory (use /tmp for tests to avoid permission issues)
 packs_base_dir: /tmp/attune-test-packs

crates/api/src/authz.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+//! RBAC authorization service for API handlers.
+//!
+//! This module evaluates grants assigned to user identities via
+//! `permission_set` and `permission_assignment`.
+
+use crate::{
+    auth::{jwt::TokenType, middleware::AuthenticatedUser},
+    middleware::ApiError,
+};
+use attune_common::{
+    rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Grant, Resource},
+    repositories::{
+        identity::{IdentityRepository, PermissionSetRepository},
+        FindById,
+    },
+};
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct AuthorizationCheck {
+    pub resource: Resource,
+    pub action: Action,
+    pub context: AuthorizationContext,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct AuthorizationService {
+    db: PgPool,
+}
+
+impl AuthorizationService {
+    pub fn new(db: PgPool) -> Self {
+        Self { db }
+    }
+
+    pub async fn authorize(
+        &self,
+        user: &AuthenticatedUser,
+        mut check: AuthorizationCheck,
+    ) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+        // Non-access tokens are governed by dedicated scope checks in route logic.
+        // They are not evaluated through identity RBAC grants.
+        if user.claims.token_type != TokenType::Access {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+
+        let identity_id = user.identity_id().map_err(|_| {
+            ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid authentication subject in access token".to_string())
+        })?;
+
+        // Ensure identity exists and load identity attributes used by attribute constraints.
+        let identity = IdentityRepository::find_by_id(&self.db, identity_id)
+            .await?
+            .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::Unauthorized("Identity not found".to_string()))?;
+
+        check.context.identity_id = identity_id;
+        check.context.identity_attributes = match identity.attributes {
+            serde_json::Value::Object(map) => map.into_iter().collect(),
+            _ => Default::default(),
+        };
+
+        let grants = self.load_effective_grants(identity_id).await?;
+
+        let allowed = Self::is_allowed(&grants, check.resource, check.action, &check.context);
+
+        if !allowed {
+            return Err(ApiError::Forbidden(format!(
+                "Insufficient permissions: {}:{}",
+                resource_name(check.resource),
+                action_name(check.action)
+            )));
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub async fn effective_grants(&self, user: &AuthenticatedUser) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, ApiError> {
+        if user.claims.token_type != TokenType::Access {
+            return Ok(Vec::new());
+        }
+
+        let identity_id = user.identity_id().map_err(|_| {
+            ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid authentication subject in access token".to_string())
+        })?;
+        self.load_effective_grants(identity_id).await
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_allowed(
+        grants: &[Grant],
+        resource: Resource,
+        action: Action,
+        context: &AuthorizationContext,
+    ) -> bool {
+        grants.iter().any(|g| g.allows(resource, action, context))
+    }
+
+    async fn load_effective_grants(&self, identity_id: i64) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, ApiError> {
+        let permission_sets =
+            PermissionSetRepository::find_by_identity(&self.db, identity_id).await?;
+
+        let mut grants = Vec::new();
+        for permission_set in permission_sets {
+            let set_grants: Vec<Grant> =
+                serde_json::from_value(permission_set.grants).map_err(|e| {
+                    ApiError::InternalServerError(format!(
+                        "Invalid grant schema in permission set '{}': {}",
+                        permission_set.r#ref, e
+                    ))
+                })?;
+            grants.extend(set_grants);
+        }
+
+        Ok(grants)
+    }
+}
+
+fn resource_name(resource: Resource) -> &'static str {
+    match resource {
+        Resource::Packs => "packs",
+        Resource::Actions => "actions",
+        Resource::Rules => "rules",
+        Resource::Triggers => "triggers",
+        Resource::Executions => "executions",
+        Resource::Events => "events",
+        Resource::Enforcements => "enforcements",
+        Resource::Inquiries => "inquiries",
+        Resource::Keys => "keys",
+        Resource::Artifacts => "artifacts",
+        Resource::Workflows => "workflows",
+        Resource::Webhooks => "webhooks",
+        Resource::Analytics => "analytics",
+        Resource::History => "history",
+        Resource::Identities => "identities",
+        Resource::Permissions => "permissions",
+    }
+}
+
+fn action_name(action: Action) -> &'static str {
+    match action {
+        Action::Read => "read",
+        Action::Create => "create",
+        Action::Update => "update",
+        Action::Delete => "delete",
+        Action::Execute => "execute",
+        Action::Cancel => "cancel",
+        Action::Respond => "respond",
+        Action::Manage => "manage",
+    }
+}

crates/api/src/dto/mod.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ pub mod history;
 pub mod inquiry;
 pub mod key;
 pub mod pack;
+pub mod permission;
 pub mod rule;
 pub mod trigger;
 pub mod webhook;
@@ -48,6 +49,11 @@ pub use inquiry::{
 };
 pub use key::{CreateKeyRequest, KeyQueryParams, KeyResponse, KeySummary, UpdateKeyRequest};
 pub use pack::{CreatePackRequest, PackResponse, PackSummary, UpdatePackRequest};
+pub use permission::{
+    CreateIdentityRequest, CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest, IdentityResponse, IdentitySummary,
+    PermissionAssignmentResponse, PermissionSetQueryParams, PermissionSetSummary,
+    UpdateIdentityRequest,
+};
 pub use rule::{CreateRuleRequest, RuleResponse, RuleSummary, UpdateRuleRequest};
 pub use trigger::{
     CreateSensorRequest, CreateTriggerRequest, SensorResponse, SensorSummary, TriggerResponse,

crates/api/src/dto/permission.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value as JsonValue;
+use utoipa::{IntoParams, ToSchema};
+use validator::Validate;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, IntoParams)]
+pub struct PermissionSetQueryParams {
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub pack_ref: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct IdentitySummary {
+    pub id: i64,
+    pub login: String,
+    pub display_name: Option<String>,
+    pub attributes: JsonValue,
+}
+
+pub type IdentityResponse = IdentitySummary;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct PermissionSetSummary {
+    pub id: i64,
+    pub r#ref: String,
+    pub pack_ref: Option<String>,
+    pub label: Option<String>,
+    pub description: Option<String>,
+    pub grants: JsonValue,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct PermissionAssignmentResponse {
+    pub id: i64,
+    pub identity_id: i64,
+    pub permission_set_id: i64,
+    pub permission_set_ref: String,
+    pub created: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest {
+    pub identity_id: Option<i64>,
+    pub identity_login: Option<String>,
+    pub permission_set_ref: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Validate, ToSchema)]
+pub struct CreateIdentityRequest {
+    #[validate(length(min = 3, max = 255))]
+    pub login: String,
+    #[validate(length(max = 255))]
+    pub display_name: Option<String>,
+    #[validate(length(min = 8, max = 128))]
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub attributes: JsonValue,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct UpdateIdentityRequest {
+    pub display_name: Option<String>,
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+    pub attributes: Option<JsonValue>,
+}

crates/api/src/lib.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 //! It is primarily used by the binary target and integration tests.
 
 pub mod auth;
+pub mod authz;
 pub mod dto;
 pub mod middleware;
 pub mod openapi;

crates/api/src/openapi.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ use crate::dto::{
         PackWorkflowSyncResponse, PackWorkflowValidationResponse, RegisterPackRequest,
         UpdatePackRequest, WorkflowSyncResult,
     },
+    permission::{
+        CreateIdentityRequest, CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest, IdentityResponse,
+        IdentitySummary, PermissionAssignmentResponse, PermissionSetSummary, UpdateIdentityRequest,
+    },
     rule::{CreateRuleRequest, RuleResponse, RuleSummary, UpdateRuleRequest},
     trigger::{
         CreateSensorRequest, CreateTriggerRequest, SensorResponse, SensorSummary, TriggerResponse,
@@ -160,6 +164,17 @@ use crate::dto::{
         crate::routes::keys::update_key,
         crate::routes::keys::delete_key,
 
+        // Permissions
+        crate::routes::permissions::list_identities,
+        crate::routes::permissions::get_identity,
+        crate::routes::permissions::create_identity,
+        crate::routes::permissions::update_identity,
+        crate::routes::permissions::delete_identity,
+        crate::routes::permissions::list_permission_sets,
+        crate::routes::permissions::list_identity_permissions,
+        crate::routes::permissions::create_permission_assignment,
+        crate::routes::permissions::delete_permission_assignment,
+
         // Workflows
         crate::routes::workflows::list_workflows,
         crate::routes::workflows::list_workflows_by_pack,
@@ -190,6 +205,8 @@ use crate::dto::{
             ApiResponse<EnforcementResponse>,
             ApiResponse<InquiryResponse>,
             ApiResponse<KeyResponse>,
+            ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>,
+            ApiResponse<PermissionAssignmentResponse>,
             ApiResponse<WorkflowResponse>,
             ApiResponse<QueueStatsResponse>,
             PaginatedResponse<PackSummary>,
@@ -202,6 +219,7 @@ use crate::dto::{
             PaginatedResponse<EnforcementSummary>,
             PaginatedResponse<InquirySummary>,
             PaginatedResponse<KeySummary>,
+            PaginatedResponse<IdentitySummary>,
             PaginatedResponse<WorkflowSummary>,
             PaginationMeta,
             SuccessResponse,
@@ -233,6 +251,15 @@ use crate::dto::{
             attune_common::models::pack_test::PackTestSummary,
             PaginatedResponse<attune_common::models::pack_test::PackTestSummary>,
 
+            // Permission DTOs
+            CreateIdentityRequest,
+            UpdateIdentityRequest,
+            IdentityResponse,
+            PermissionSetSummary,
+            PermissionAssignmentResponse,
+            CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest,
+            IdentitySummary,
+
             // Action DTOs
             CreateActionRequest,
             UpdateActionRequest,

crates/api/src/routes/actions.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use axum::{
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use validator::Validate;
 
+use attune_common::rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource};
 use attune_common::repositories::{
     action::{ActionRepository, ActionSearchFilters, CreateActionInput, UpdateActionInput},
     pack::PackRepository,
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ use attune_common::repositories::{
 
 use crate::{
     auth::middleware::RequireAuth,
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
     dto::{
         action::{
             ActionResponse, ActionSummary, CreateActionRequest, QueueStatsResponse,
@@ -153,7 +155,7 @@ pub async fn get_action(
 )]
 pub async fn create_action(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Json(request): Json<CreateActionRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Validate request
@@ -175,6 +177,26 @@ pub async fn create_action(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Pack '{}' not found", request.pack_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(pack.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(request.r#ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Actions,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // If runtime is specified, we could verify it exists (future enhancement)
     // For now, the database foreign key constraint will handle invalid runtime IDs
 
@@ -219,7 +241,7 @@ pub async fn create_action(
 )]
 pub async fn update_action(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(action_ref): Path<String>,
     Json(request): Json<UpdateActionRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -231,6 +253,27 @@ pub async fn update_action(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Action '{}' not found", action_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(existing_action.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(existing_action.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(existing_action.pack_ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Actions,
+                    action: Action::Update,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Create update input
     let update_input = UpdateActionInput {
         label: request.label,
@@ -269,7 +312,7 @@ pub async fn update_action(
 )]
 pub async fn delete_action(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(action_ref): Path<String>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Check if action exists
@@ -277,6 +320,27 @@ pub async fn delete_action(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Action '{}' not found", action_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(action.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(action.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(action.pack_ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Actions,
+                    action: Action::Delete,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Delete the action
     let deleted = ActionRepository::delete(&state.db, action.id).await?;
 

crates/api/src/routes/auth.rs

@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ pub async fn register(
     State(state): State<SharedState>,
     Json(payload): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> Result<Json<ApiResponse<TokenResponse>>, ApiError> {
+    if !state.config.security.allow_self_registration {
+        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden(
+            "Self-service registration is disabled; identities must be provisioned by an administrator or identity provider".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
     // Validate request
     payload
         .validate()
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ pub async fn register(
     // Hash password
     let password_hash = hash_password(&payload.password)?;
 
-    // Create identity with password hash
+    // Registration creates an identity only; permission assignments are managed separately.
     let input = CreateIdentityInput {
         login: payload.login.clone(),
         display_name: payload.display_name,

crates/api/src/routes/executions.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use axum::{
     routing::get,
     Json, Router,
 };
+use chrono::Utc;
 use futures::stream::{Stream, StreamExt};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio_stream::wrappers::BroadcastStream;
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ use sqlx::Row;
 
 use crate::{
     auth::middleware::RequireAuth,
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
     dto::{
         common::{PaginatedResponse, PaginationParams},
         execution::{
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ use crate::{
     middleware::{ApiError, ApiResult},
     state::AppState,
 };
+use attune_common::rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource};
 
 /// Create a new execution (manual execution)
 ///
@@ -61,7 +64,7 @@ use crate::{
 )]
 pub async fn create_execution(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Json(request): Json<CreateExecutionRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Validate that the action exists
@@ -69,6 +72,42 @@ pub async fn create_execution(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Action '{}' not found", request.action_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+
+        let mut action_ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        action_ctx.target_id = Some(action.id);
+        action_ctx.target_ref = Some(action.r#ref.clone());
+        action_ctx.pack_ref = Some(action.pack_ref.clone());
+
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Actions,
+                    action: Action::Execute,
+                    context: action_ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+
+        let mut execution_ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        execution_ctx.pack_ref = Some(action.pack_ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Executions,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: execution_ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Create execution input
     let execution_input = CreateExecutionInput {
         action: Some(action.id),
@@ -440,9 +479,17 @@ pub async fn cancel_execution(
             ..Default::default()
         };
         let updated = ExecutionRepository::update(&state.db, id, update).await?;
+        let delegated_to_executor = publish_status_change_to_executor(
+            publisher.as_deref(),
+            &execution,
+            ExecutionStatus::Cancelled,
+            "api-service",
+        )
+        .await;
 
-        // Cascade to workflow children if this is a workflow execution
+        if !delegated_to_executor {
-        cancel_workflow_children(&state.db, publisher.as_deref(), id).await;
+            cancel_workflow_children(&state.db, publisher.as_deref(), id).await;
+        }
 
         let response = ApiResponse::new(ExecutionResponse::from(updated));
         return Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(response)));
@@ -454,6 +501,13 @@ pub async fn cancel_execution(
         ..Default::default()
     };
     let updated = ExecutionRepository::update(&state.db, id, update).await?;
+    let delegated_to_executor = publish_status_change_to_executor(
+        publisher.as_deref(),
+        &execution,
+        ExecutionStatus::Canceling,
+        "api-service",
+    )
+    .await;
 
     // Send cancel request to the worker via MQ
     if let Some(worker_id) = execution.executor {
@@ -465,8 +519,9 @@ pub async fn cancel_execution(
         );
     }
 
-    // Cascade to workflow children if this is a workflow execution
+    if !delegated_to_executor {
-    cancel_workflow_children(&state.db, publisher.as_deref(), id).await;
+        cancel_workflow_children(&state.db, publisher.as_deref(), id).await;
+    }
 
     let response = ApiResponse::new(ExecutionResponse::from(updated));
     Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(response)))
@@ -504,6 +559,53 @@ async fn send_cancel_to_worker(publisher: Option<&Publisher>, execution_id: i64,
     }
 }
 
+async fn publish_status_change_to_executor(
+    publisher: Option<&Publisher>,
+    execution: &attune_common::models::Execution,
+    new_status: ExecutionStatus,
+    source: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    let Some(publisher) = publisher else {
+        return false;
+    };
+
+    let new_status = match new_status {
+        ExecutionStatus::Requested => "requested",
+        ExecutionStatus::Scheduling => "scheduling",
+        ExecutionStatus::Scheduled => "scheduled",
+        ExecutionStatus::Running => "running",
+        ExecutionStatus::Completed => "completed",
+        ExecutionStatus::Failed => "failed",
+        ExecutionStatus::Canceling => "canceling",
+        ExecutionStatus::Cancelled => "cancelled",
+        ExecutionStatus::Timeout => "timeout",
+        ExecutionStatus::Abandoned => "abandoned",
+    };
+
+    let payload = attune_common::mq::ExecutionStatusChangedPayload {
+        execution_id: execution.id,
+        action_ref: execution.action_ref.clone(),
+        previous_status: format!("{:?}", execution.status).to_lowercase(),
+        new_status: new_status.to_string(),
+        changed_at: Utc::now(),
+    };
+
+    let envelope = MessageEnvelope::new(MessageType::ExecutionStatusChanged, payload)
+        .with_source(source)
+        .with_correlation_id(uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
+
+    if let Err(e) = publisher.publish_envelope(&envelope).await {
+        tracing::error!(
+            "Failed to publish status change for execution {} to executor: {}",
+            execution.id,
+            e
+        );
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    true
+}
+
 /// Resolve the [`CancellationPolicy`] for a workflow parent execution.
 ///
 /// Looks up the `workflow_execution` → `workflow_definition` chain and

crates/api/src/routes/keys.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ use axum::{
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use validator::Validate;
 
-use attune_common::models::OwnerType;
 use attune_common::repositories::{
     action::ActionRepository,
     key::{CreateKeyInput, KeyRepository, KeySearchFilters, UpdateKeyInput},
@@ -18,9 +17,14 @@ use attune_common::repositories::{
     trigger::SensorRepository,
     Create, Delete, FindByRef, Update,
 };
+use attune_common::{
+    models::{key::Key, OwnerType},
+    rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource},
+};
 
-use crate::auth::RequireAuth;
+use crate::auth::{jwt::TokenType, RequireAuth};
 use crate::{
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
     dto::{
         common::{PaginatedResponse, PaginationParams},
         key::{CreateKeyRequest, KeyQueryParams, KeyResponse, KeySummary, UpdateKeyRequest},
@@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ use crate::{
     security(("bearer_auth" = []))
 )]
 pub async fn list_keys(
-    _user: RequireAuth,
+    user: RequireAuth,
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
     Query(query): Query<KeyQueryParams>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -55,8 +59,33 @@ pub async fn list_keys(
     };
 
     let result = KeyRepository::search(&state.db, &filters).await?;
+    let mut rows = result.rows;
 
-    let paginated_keys: Vec<KeySummary> = result.rows.into_iter().map(KeySummary::from).collect();
+    if user.0.claims.token_type == TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .0
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let grants = authz.effective_grants(&user.0).await?;
+
+        // Ensure the principal can read at least some key records.
+        let can_read_any_key = grants
+            .iter()
+            .any(|g| g.resource == Resource::Keys && g.actions.contains(&Action::Read));
+        if !can_read_any_key {
+            return Err(ApiError::Forbidden(
+                "Insufficient permissions: keys:read".to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        rows.retain(|key| {
+            let ctx = key_authorization_context(identity_id, key);
+            AuthorizationService::is_allowed(&grants, Resource::Keys, Action::Read, &ctx)
+        });
+    }
+
+    let paginated_keys: Vec<KeySummary> = rows.into_iter().map(KeySummary::from).collect();
 
     let pagination_params = PaginationParams {
         page: query.page,
@@ -83,7 +112,7 @@ pub async fn list_keys(
     security(("bearer_auth" = []))
 )]
 pub async fn get_key(
-    _user: RequireAuth,
+    user: RequireAuth,
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
     Path(key_ref): Path<String>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -91,6 +120,26 @@ pub async fn get_key(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Key '{}' not found", key_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.0.claims.token_type == TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .0
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user.0,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Keys,
+                    action: Action::Read,
+                    context: key_authorization_context(identity_id, &key),
+                },
+            )
+            .await
+            // Hide unauthorized records behind 404 to reduce enumeration leakage.
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Key '{}' not found", key_ref)))?;
+    }
+
     // Decrypt value if encrypted
     if key.encrypted {
         let encryption_key = state
@@ -130,13 +179,37 @@ pub async fn get_key(
     security(("bearer_auth" = []))
 )]
 pub async fn create_key(
-    _user: RequireAuth,
+    user: RequireAuth,
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
     Json(request): Json<CreateKeyRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Validate request
     request.validate()?;
 
+    if user.0.claims.token_type == TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .0
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.owner_identity_id = request.owner_identity;
+        ctx.owner_type = Some(request.owner_type);
+        ctx.encrypted = Some(request.encrypted);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(request.r#ref.clone());
+
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user.0,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Keys,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Check if key with same ref already exists
     if KeyRepository::find_by_ref(&state.db, &request.r#ref)
         .await?
@@ -299,7 +372,7 @@ pub async fn create_key(
     security(("bearer_auth" = []))
 )]
 pub async fn update_key(
-    _user: RequireAuth,
+    user: RequireAuth,
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
     Path(key_ref): Path<String>,
     Json(request): Json<UpdateKeyRequest>,
@@ -312,6 +385,24 @@ pub async fn update_key(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Key '{}' not found", key_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.0.claims.token_type == TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .0
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user.0,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Keys,
+                    action: Action::Update,
+                    context: key_authorization_context(identity_id, &existing),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Handle value update with encryption
     let (value, encrypted, encryption_key_hash) = if let Some(new_value) = request.value {
         let should_encrypt = request.encrypted.unwrap_or(existing.encrypted);
@@ -395,7 +486,7 @@ pub async fn update_key(
     security(("bearer_auth" = []))
 )]
 pub async fn delete_key(
-    _user: RequireAuth,
+    user: RequireAuth,
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
     Path(key_ref): Path<String>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -404,6 +495,24 @@ pub async fn delete_key(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Key '{}' not found", key_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.0.claims.token_type == TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .0
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user.0,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Keys,
+                    action: Action::Delete,
+                    context: key_authorization_context(identity_id, &key),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Delete the key
     let deleted = KeyRepository::delete(&state.db, key.id).await?;
 
@@ -425,3 +534,13 @@ pub fn routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
             get(get_key).put(update_key).delete(delete_key),
         )
 }
+
+fn key_authorization_context(identity_id: i64, key: &Key) -> AuthorizationContext {
+    let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+    ctx.target_id = Some(key.id);
+    ctx.target_ref = Some(key.r#ref.clone());
+    ctx.owner_identity_id = key.owner_identity;
+    ctx.owner_type = Some(key.owner_type);
+    ctx.encrypted = Some(key.encrypted);
+    ctx
+}

crates/api/src/routes/mod.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ pub mod history;
 pub mod inquiries;
 pub mod keys;
 pub mod packs;
+pub mod permissions;
 pub mod rules;
 pub mod triggers;
 pub mod webhooks;
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ pub use history::routes as history_routes;
 pub use inquiries::routes as inquiry_routes;
 pub use keys::routes as key_routes;
 pub use packs::routes as pack_routes;
+pub use permissions::routes as permission_routes;
 pub use rules::routes as rule_routes;
 pub use triggers::routes as trigger_routes;
 pub use webhooks::routes as webhook_routes;

crates/api/src/routes/packs.rs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use validator::Validate;
 
 use attune_common::models::pack_test::PackTestResult;
 use attune_common::mq::{MessageEnvelope, MessageType, PackRegisteredPayload};
+use attune_common::rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource};
 use attune_common::repositories::{
     pack::{CreatePackInput, UpdatePackInput},
     Create, Delete, FindById, FindByRef, PackRepository, PackTestRepository, Pagination, Update,
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ use attune_common::workflow::{PackWorkflowService, PackWorkflowServiceConfig};
 
 use crate::{
     auth::middleware::RequireAuth,
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
     dto::{
         common::{PaginatedResponse, PaginationParams},
         pack::{
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ pub async fn get_pack(
 )]
 pub async fn create_pack(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Json(request): Json<CreatePackRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Validate request
@@ -129,6 +131,25 @@ pub async fn create_pack(
         )));
     }
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(request.r#ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Create pack input
     let pack_input = CreatePackInput {
         r#ref: request.r#ref,
@@ -202,7 +223,7 @@ pub async fn create_pack(
 )]
 pub async fn update_pack(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(pack_ref): Path<String>,
     Json(request): Json<UpdatePackRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -214,6 +235,26 @@ pub async fn update_pack(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Pack '{}' not found", pack_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(existing_pack.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(existing_pack.r#ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Update,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Create update input
     let update_input = UpdatePackInput {
         label: request.label,
@@ -284,7 +325,7 @@ pub async fn update_pack(
 )]
 pub async fn delete_pack(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(pack_ref): Path<String>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Check if pack exists
@@ -292,6 +333,26 @@ pub async fn delete_pack(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Pack '{}' not found", pack_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(pack.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(pack.r#ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Delete,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Delete the pack from the database (cascades to actions, triggers, sensors, rules, etc.
     // Foreign keys on execution, event, enforcement, and rule tables use ON DELETE SET NULL
     // so historical records are preserved with their text ref fields intact.)
@@ -475,6 +536,23 @@ pub async fn upload_pack(
 
     const MAX_PACK_SIZE: usize = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100 MB
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     let mut pack_bytes: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
     let mut force = false;
     let mut skip_tests = false;
@@ -649,6 +727,23 @@ pub async fn register_pack(
     // Validate request
     request.validate()?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Call internal registration logic
     let pack_id = register_pack_internal(
         state.clone(),
@@ -1207,6 +1302,23 @@ pub async fn install_pack(
 
     tracing::info!("Installing pack from source: {}", request.source);
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Get user ID early to avoid borrow issues
     let user_id = user.identity_id().ok();
     let user_sub = user.claims.sub.clone();
@@ -2247,6 +2359,23 @@ pub async fn register_packs_batch(
     RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Json(request): Json<RegisterPacksRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<Json<ApiResponse<RegisterPacksResponse>>> {
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Packs,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id),
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     let start = std::time::Instant::now();
     let mut registered = Vec::new();
     let mut failed = Vec::new();

crates/api/src/routes/permissions.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+use axum::{
+    extract::{Path, Query, State},
+    http::StatusCode,
+    response::IntoResponse,
+    routing::{delete, get, post},
+    Json, Router,
+};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use validator::Validate;
+
+use attune_common::{
+    models::identity::{Identity, PermissionSet},
+    rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource},
+    repositories::{
+        identity::{
+            CreateIdentityInput, CreatePermissionAssignmentInput, IdentityRepository,
+            PermissionAssignmentRepository, PermissionSetRepository, UpdateIdentityInput,
+        },
+        Create, Delete, FindById, FindByRef, List, Update,
+    },
+};
+
+use crate::{
+    auth::hash_password,
+    auth::middleware::RequireAuth,
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
+    dto::{
+        common::{PaginatedResponse, PaginationParams},
+        ApiResponse, CreateIdentityRequest, CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest, IdentityResponse,
+        IdentitySummary, PermissionAssignmentResponse, PermissionSetQueryParams,
+        PermissionSetSummary, SuccessResponse, UpdateIdentityRequest,
+    },
+    middleware::{ApiError, ApiResult},
+    state::AppState,
+};
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    get,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(PaginationParams),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "List identities", body = PaginatedResponse<IdentitySummary>)
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn list_identities(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Query(query): Query<PaginationParams>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Identities, Action::Read).await?;
+
+    let identities = IdentityRepository::list(&state.db).await?;
+    let total = identities.len() as u64;
+    let start = query.offset() as usize;
+    let end = (start + query.limit() as usize).min(identities.len());
+    let page_items = if start >= identities.len() {
+        Vec::new()
+    } else {
+        identities[start..end]
+            .iter()
+            .cloned()
+            .map(IdentitySummary::from)
+            .collect()
+    };
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(PaginatedResponse::new(page_items, &query, total)),
+    ))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    get,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities/{id}",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(
+        ("id" = i64, Path, description = "Identity ID")
+    ),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "Identity details", body = inline(ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>)),
+        (status = 404, description = "Identity not found")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn get_identity(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Path(identity_id): Path<i64>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Identities, Action::Read).await?;
+
+    let identity = IdentityRepository::find_by_id(&state.db, identity_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Identity '{}' not found", identity_id)))?;
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(ApiResponse::new(IdentityResponse::from(identity))),
+    ))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    post,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    request_body = CreateIdentityRequest,
+    responses(
+        (status = 201, description = "Identity created", body = inline(ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>)),
+        (status = 409, description = "Identity already exists")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn create_identity(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Json(request): Json<CreateIdentityRequest>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Identities, Action::Create).await?;
+    request.validate()?;
+
+    let password_hash = match request.password {
+        Some(password) => Some(hash_password(&password)?),
+        None => None,
+    };
+
+    let identity = IdentityRepository::create(
+        &state.db,
+        CreateIdentityInput {
+            login: request.login,
+            display_name: request.display_name,
+            password_hash,
+            attributes: request.attributes,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::CREATED,
+        Json(ApiResponse::new(IdentityResponse::from(identity))),
+    ))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    put,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities/{id}",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(
+        ("id" = i64, Path, description = "Identity ID")
+    ),
+    request_body = UpdateIdentityRequest,
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "Identity updated", body = inline(ApiResponse<IdentityResponse>)),
+        (status = 404, description = "Identity not found")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn update_identity(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Path(identity_id): Path<i64>,
+    Json(request): Json<UpdateIdentityRequest>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Identities, Action::Update).await?;
+
+    IdentityRepository::find_by_id(&state.db, identity_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Identity '{}' not found", identity_id)))?;
+
+    let password_hash = match request.password {
+        Some(password) => Some(hash_password(&password)?),
+        None => None,
+    };
+
+    let identity = IdentityRepository::update(
+        &state.db,
+        identity_id,
+        UpdateIdentityInput {
+            display_name: request.display_name,
+            password_hash,
+            attributes: request.attributes,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(ApiResponse::new(IdentityResponse::from(identity))),
+    ))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    delete,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities/{id}",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(
+        ("id" = i64, Path, description = "Identity ID")
+    ),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "Identity deleted", body = inline(ApiResponse<SuccessResponse>)),
+        (status = 404, description = "Identity not found")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn delete_identity(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Path(identity_id): Path<i64>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Identities, Action::Delete).await?;
+
+    let caller_identity_id = user
+        .identity_id()
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+    if caller_identity_id == identity_id {
+        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "Refusing to delete the currently authenticated identity".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let deleted = IdentityRepository::delete(&state.db, identity_id).await?;
+    if !deleted {
+        return Err(ApiError::NotFound(format!(
+            "Identity '{}' not found",
+            identity_id
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(ApiResponse::new(SuccessResponse::new(
+            "Identity deleted successfully",
+        ))),
+    ))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    get,
+    path = "/api/v1/permissions/sets",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(PermissionSetQueryParams),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "List permission sets", body = Vec<PermissionSetSummary>)
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn list_permission_sets(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Query(query): Query<PermissionSetQueryParams>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Permissions, Action::Read).await?;
+
+    let mut permission_sets = PermissionSetRepository::list(&state.db).await?;
+    if let Some(pack_ref) = &query.pack_ref {
+        permission_sets.retain(|ps| ps.pack_ref.as_deref() == Some(pack_ref.as_str()));
+    }
+
+    let response: Vec<PermissionSetSummary> = permission_sets
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(PermissionSetSummary::from)
+        .collect();
+
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(response)))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    get,
+    path = "/api/v1/identities/{id}/permissions",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(
+        ("id" = i64, Path, description = "Identity ID")
+    ),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "List permission assignments for an identity", body = Vec<PermissionAssignmentResponse>),
+        (status = 404, description = "Identity not found")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn list_identity_permissions(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Path(identity_id): Path<i64>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Permissions, Action::Read).await?;
+
+    IdentityRepository::find_by_id(&state.db, identity_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Identity '{}' not found", identity_id)))?;
+
+    let assignments =
+        PermissionAssignmentRepository::find_by_identity(&state.db, identity_id).await?;
+    let permission_sets = PermissionSetRepository::find_by_identity(&state.db, identity_id).await?;
+
+    let permission_set_refs = permission_sets
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|ps| (ps.id, ps.r#ref))
+        .collect::<std::collections::HashMap<_, _>>();
+
+    let response: Vec<PermissionAssignmentResponse> = assignments
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter_map(|assignment| {
+            permission_set_refs
+                .get(&assignment.permset)
+                .cloned()
+                .map(|permission_set_ref| PermissionAssignmentResponse {
+                    id: assignment.id,
+                    identity_id: assignment.identity,
+                    permission_set_id: assignment.permset,
+                    permission_set_ref,
+                    created: assignment.created,
+                })
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(response)))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    post,
+    path = "/api/v1/permissions/assignments",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    request_body = CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest,
+    responses(
+        (status = 201, description = "Permission assignment created", body = inline(ApiResponse<PermissionAssignmentResponse>)),
+        (status = 404, description = "Identity or permission set not found"),
+        (status = 409, description = "Assignment already exists")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn create_permission_assignment(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Json(request): Json<CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Permissions, Action::Manage).await?;
+
+    let identity = resolve_identity(&state, &request).await?;
+    let permission_set =
+        PermissionSetRepository::find_by_ref(&state.db, &request.permission_set_ref)
+            .await?
+            .ok_or_else(|| {
+                ApiError::NotFound(format!(
+                    "Permission set '{}' not found",
+                    request.permission_set_ref
+                ))
+            })?;
+
+    let assignment = PermissionAssignmentRepository::create(
+        &state.db,
+        CreatePermissionAssignmentInput {
+            identity: identity.id,
+            permset: permission_set.id,
+        },
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    let response = PermissionAssignmentResponse {
+        id: assignment.id,
+        identity_id: assignment.identity,
+        permission_set_id: assignment.permset,
+        permission_set_ref: permission_set.r#ref,
+        created: assignment.created,
+    };
+
+    Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(ApiResponse::new(response))))
+}
+
+#[utoipa::path(
+    delete,
+    path = "/api/v1/permissions/assignments/{id}",
+    tag = "permissions",
+    params(
+        ("id" = i64, Path, description = "Permission assignment ID")
+    ),
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "Permission assignment deleted", body = inline(ApiResponse<SuccessResponse>)),
+        (status = 404, description = "Assignment not found")
+    ),
+    security(("bearer_auth" = []))
+)]
+pub async fn delete_permission_assignment(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
+    Path(assignment_id): Path<i64>,
+) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
+    authorize_permissions(&state, &user, Resource::Permissions, Action::Manage).await?;
+
+    let existing = PermissionAssignmentRepository::find_by_id(&state.db, assignment_id)
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            ApiError::NotFound(format!(
+                "Permission assignment '{}' not found",
+                assignment_id
+            ))
+        })?;
+
+    let deleted = PermissionAssignmentRepository::delete(&state.db, existing.id).await?;
+    if !deleted {
+        return Err(ApiError::NotFound(format!(
+            "Permission assignment '{}' not found",
+            assignment_id
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok((
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(ApiResponse::new(SuccessResponse::new(
+            "Permission assignment deleted successfully",
+        ))),
+    ))
+}
+
+pub fn routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/identities", get(list_identities).post(create_identity))
+        .route(
+            "/identities/{id}",
+            get(get_identity)
+                .put(update_identity)
+                .delete(delete_identity),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/identities/{id}/permissions",
+            get(list_identity_permissions),
+        )
+        .route("/permissions/sets", get(list_permission_sets))
+        .route(
+            "/permissions/assignments",
+            post(create_permission_assignment),
+        )
+        .route(
+            "/permissions/assignments/{id}",
+            delete(delete_permission_assignment),
+        )
+}
+
+async fn authorize_permissions(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    user: &crate::auth::middleware::AuthenticatedUser,
+    resource: Resource,
+    action: Action,
+) -> ApiResult<()> {
+    let identity_id = user
+        .identity_id()
+        .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+    let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+    authz
+        .authorize(
+            user,
+            AuthorizationCheck {
+                resource,
+                action,
+                context: AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id),
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+}
+
+async fn resolve_identity(
+    state: &Arc<AppState>,
+    request: &CreatePermissionAssignmentRequest,
+) -> ApiResult<Identity> {
+    match (request.identity_id, request.identity_login.as_deref()) {
+        (Some(identity_id), None) => IdentityRepository::find_by_id(&state.db, identity_id)
+            .await?
+            .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Identity '{}' not found", identity_id))),
+        (None, Some(identity_login)) => {
+            IdentityRepository::find_by_login(&state.db, identity_login)
+                .await?
+                .ok_or_else(|| {
+                    ApiError::NotFound(format!("Identity '{}' not found", identity_login))
+                })
+        }
+        (Some(_), Some(_)) => Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "Provide either identity_id or identity_login, not both".to_string(),
+        )),
+        (None, None) => Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
+            "Either identity_id or identity_login is required".to_string(),
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<Identity> for IdentitySummary {
+    fn from(value: Identity) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            id: value.id,
+            login: value.login,
+            display_name: value.display_name,
+            attributes: value.attributes,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<PermissionSet> for PermissionSetSummary {
+    fn from(value: PermissionSet) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            id: value.id,
+            r#ref: value.r#ref,
+            pack_ref: value.pack_ref,
+            label: value.label,
+            description: value.description,
+            grants: value.grants,
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/api/src/routes/rules.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ use validator::Validate;
 use attune_common::mq::{
     MessageEnvelope, MessageType, RuleCreatedPayload, RuleDisabledPayload, RuleEnabledPayload,
 };
+use attune_common::rbac::{Action, AuthorizationContext, Resource};
 use attune_common::repositories::{
     action::ActionRepository,
     pack::PackRepository,
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ use attune_common::repositories::{
 
 use crate::{
     auth::middleware::RequireAuth,
+    authz::{AuthorizationCheck, AuthorizationService},
     dto::{
         common::{PaginatedResponse, PaginationParams},
         rule::{CreateRuleRequest, RuleResponse, RuleSummary, UpdateRuleRequest},
@@ -283,7 +285,7 @@ pub async fn get_rule(
 )]
 pub async fn create_rule(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Json(request): Json<CreateRuleRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Validate request
@@ -317,6 +319,26 @@ pub async fn create_rule(
             ApiError::NotFound(format!("Trigger '{}' not found", request.trigger_ref))
         })?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(pack.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(request.r#ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Rules,
+                    action: Action::Create,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Validate trigger parameters against schema
     validate_trigger_params(&trigger, &request.trigger_params)?;
 
@@ -392,7 +414,7 @@ pub async fn create_rule(
 )]
 pub async fn update_rule(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(rule_ref): Path<String>,
     Json(request): Json<UpdateRuleRequest>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
@@ -404,6 +426,27 @@ pub async fn update_rule(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Rule '{}' not found", rule_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(existing_rule.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(existing_rule.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(existing_rule.pack_ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Rules,
+                    action: Action::Update,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // If action parameters are being updated, validate against the action's schema
     if let Some(ref action_params) = request.action_params {
         let action = ActionRepository::find_by_ref(&state.db, &existing_rule.action_ref)
@@ -489,7 +532,7 @@ pub async fn update_rule(
 )]
 pub async fn delete_rule(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    RequireAuth(_user): RequireAuth,
+    RequireAuth(user): RequireAuth,
     Path(rule_ref): Path<String>,
 ) -> ApiResult<impl IntoResponse> {
     // Check if rule exists
@@ -497,6 +540,27 @@ pub async fn delete_rule(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| ApiError::NotFound(format!("Rule '{}' not found", rule_ref)))?;
 
+    if user.claims.token_type == crate::auth::jwt::TokenType::Access {
+        let identity_id = user
+            .identity_id()
+            .map_err(|_| ApiError::Unauthorized("Invalid user identity".to_string()))?;
+        let authz = AuthorizationService::new(state.db.clone());
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(identity_id);
+        ctx.target_id = Some(rule.id);
+        ctx.target_ref = Some(rule.r#ref.clone());
+        ctx.pack_ref = Some(rule.pack_ref.clone());
+        authz
+            .authorize(
+                &user,
+                AuthorizationCheck {
+                    resource: Resource::Rules,
+                    action: Action::Delete,
+                    context: ctx,
+                },
+            )
+            .await?;
+    }
+
     // Delete the rule
     let deleted = RuleRepository::delete(&state.db, rule.id).await?;
 

crates/api/src/server.rs

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ impl Server {
             .merge(routes::inquiry_routes())
             .merge(routes::event_routes())
             .merge(routes::key_routes())
+            .merge(routes::permission_routes())
             .merge(routes::workflow_routes())
             .merge(routes::webhook_routes())
             .merge(routes::history_routes())

crates/api/tests/helpers.rs

@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ use attune_common::{
     models::*,
     repositories::{
         action::{ActionRepository, CreateActionInput},
+        identity::{
+            CreatePermissionAssignmentInput, CreatePermissionSetInput,
+            PermissionAssignmentRepository, PermissionSetRepository,
+        },
         pack::{CreatePackInput, PackRepository},
         trigger::{CreateTriggerInput, TriggerRepository},
         workflow::{CreateWorkflowDefinitionInput, WorkflowDefinitionRepository},
@@ -246,6 +250,47 @@ impl TestContext {
         Ok(self)
     }
 
+    /// Create and authenticate a test user with identity + permission admin grants.
+    pub async fn with_admin_auth(mut self) -> Result<Self> {
+        let unique_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string().replace("-", "")[..8].to_string();
+        let login = format!("adminuser_{}", unique_id);
+        let token = self.create_test_user(&login).await?;
+
+        let identity = attune_common::repositories::identity::IdentityRepository::find_by_login(
+            &self.pool, &login,
+        )
+        .await?
+        .ok_or_else(|| format!("Failed to find newly created identity '{}'", login))?;
+
+        let permset = PermissionSetRepository::create(
+            &self.pool,
+            CreatePermissionSetInput {
+                r#ref: "core.admin".to_string(),
+                pack: None,
+                pack_ref: None,
+                label: Some("Admin".to_string()),
+                description: Some("Test admin permission set".to_string()),
+                grants: json!([
+                    {"resource": "identities", "actions": ["read", "create", "update", "delete"]},
+                    {"resource": "permissions", "actions": ["read", "create", "update", "delete", "manage"]}
+                ]),
+            },
+        )
+        .await?;
+
+        PermissionAssignmentRepository::create(
+            &self.pool,
+            CreatePermissionAssignmentInput {
+                identity: identity.id,
+                permset: permset.id,
+            },
+        )
+        .await?;
+
+        self.token = Some(token);
+        Ok(self)
+    }
+
     /// Create a test user and return access token
     async fn create_test_user(&self, login: &str) -> Result<String> {
         // Register via API to get real token

crates/api/tests/permissions_api_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+use axum::http::StatusCode;
+use helpers::*;
+use serde_json::json;
+
+mod helpers;
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "integration test — requires database"]
+async fn test_identity_crud_and_permission_assignment_flow() {
+    let ctx = TestContext::new()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create test context")
+        .with_admin_auth()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create admin-authenticated test user");
+
+    let create_identity_response = ctx
+        .post(
+            "/api/v1/identities",
+            json!({
+                "login": "managed_user",
+                "display_name": "Managed User",
+                "password": "ManagedPass123!",
+                "attributes": {
+                    "department": "platform"
+                }
+            }),
+            ctx.token(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create identity");
+
+    assert_eq!(create_identity_response.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
+
+    let created_identity: serde_json::Value = create_identity_response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to parse identity create response");
+    let identity_id = created_identity["data"]["id"]
+        .as_i64()
+        .expect("Missing identity id");
+
+    let list_identities_response = ctx
+        .get("/api/v1/identities", ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to list identities");
+    assert_eq!(list_identities_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let identities_body: serde_json::Value = list_identities_response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to parse identities response");
+    assert!(identities_body["data"]
+        .as_array()
+        .expect("Expected data array")
+        .iter()
+        .any(|item| item["login"] == "managed_user"));
+
+    let update_identity_response = ctx
+        .put(
+            &format!("/api/v1/identities/{}", identity_id),
+            json!({
+                "display_name": "Managed User Updated",
+                "attributes": {
+                    "department": "security"
+                }
+            }),
+            ctx.token(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to update identity");
+    assert_eq!(update_identity_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let get_identity_response = ctx
+        .get(&format!("/api/v1/identities/{}", identity_id), ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to get identity");
+    assert_eq!(get_identity_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let identity_body: serde_json::Value = get_identity_response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to parse get identity response");
+    assert_eq!(
+        identity_body["data"]["display_name"],
+        "Managed User Updated"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        identity_body["data"]["attributes"]["department"],
+        "security"
+    );
+
+    let permission_sets_response = ctx
+        .get("/api/v1/permissions/sets", ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to list permission sets");
+    assert_eq!(permission_sets_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let assignment_response = ctx
+        .post(
+            "/api/v1/permissions/assignments",
+            json!({
+                "identity_id": identity_id,
+                "permission_set_ref": "core.admin"
+            }),
+            ctx.token(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create permission assignment");
+    assert_eq!(assignment_response.status(), StatusCode::CREATED);
+
+    let assignment_body: serde_json::Value = assignment_response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to parse permission assignment response");
+    let assignment_id = assignment_body["data"]["id"]
+        .as_i64()
+        .expect("Missing assignment id");
+    assert_eq!(assignment_body["data"]["permission_set_ref"], "core.admin");
+
+    let list_assignments_response = ctx
+        .get(
+            &format!("/api/v1/identities/{}/permissions", identity_id),
+            ctx.token(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to list identity permissions");
+    assert_eq!(list_assignments_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let assignments_body: serde_json::Value = list_assignments_response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to parse identity permissions response");
+    assert!(assignments_body
+        .as_array()
+        .expect("Expected array response")
+        .iter()
+        .any(|item| item["permission_set_ref"] == "core.admin"));
+
+    let delete_assignment_response = ctx
+        .delete(
+            &format!("/api/v1/permissions/assignments/{}", assignment_id),
+            ctx.token(),
+        )
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to delete assignment");
+    assert_eq!(delete_assignment_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let delete_identity_response = ctx
+        .delete(&format!("/api/v1/identities/{}", identity_id), ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to delete identity");
+    assert_eq!(delete_identity_response.status(), StatusCode::OK);
+
+    let missing_identity_response = ctx
+        .get(&format!("/api/v1/identities/{}", identity_id), ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to fetch deleted identity");
+    assert_eq!(missing_identity_response.status(), StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore = "integration test — requires database"]
+async fn test_plain_authenticated_user_cannot_manage_identities() {
+    let ctx = TestContext::new()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to create test context")
+        .with_auth()
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to authenticate plain test user");
+
+    let response = ctx
+        .get("/api/v1/identities", ctx.token())
+        .await
+        .expect("Failed to call identities endpoint");
+
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+}

crates/common/src/config.rs

@@ -295,6 +295,10 @@ pub struct SecurityConfig {
     /// Enable authentication
     #[serde(default = "default_true")]
     pub enable_auth: bool,
+
+    /// Allow unauthenticated self-service user registration
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub allow_self_registration: bool,
 }
 
 fn default_jwt_access_expiration() -> u64 {
@@ -676,6 +680,7 @@ impl Default for SecurityConfig {
             jwt_refresh_expiration: default_jwt_refresh_expiration(),
             encryption_key: None,
             enable_auth: true,
+            allow_self_registration: false,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -924,6 +929,7 @@ mod tests {
                 jwt_refresh_expiration: 604800,
                 encryption_key: Some("a".repeat(32)),
                 enable_auth: true,
+                allow_self_registration: false,
             },
             worker: None,
             sensor: None,

crates/common/src/lib.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ pub mod models;
 pub mod mq;
 pub mod pack_environment;
 pub mod pack_registry;
+pub mod rbac;
 pub mod repositories;
 pub mod runtime_detection;
 pub mod schema;

crates/common/src/models.rs

@@ -430,6 +430,10 @@ pub mod runtime {
         #[serde(default)]
         pub interpreter: InterpreterConfig,
 
+        /// Strategy for inline code execution.
+        #[serde(default)]
+        pub inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig,
+
         /// Optional isolated environment configuration (venv, node_modules, etc.)
         #[serde(default)]
         pub environment: Option<EnvironmentConfig>,
@@ -449,6 +453,33 @@ pub mod runtime {
         pub env_vars: HashMap<String, String>,
     }
 
+    /// Controls how inline code is materialized before execution.
+    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
+    pub struct InlineExecutionConfig {
+        /// Whether inline code is passed directly to the interpreter or first
+        /// written to a temporary file.
+        #[serde(default)]
+        pub strategy: InlineExecutionStrategy,
+
+        /// Optional extension for temporary inline files (e.g. ".sh").
+        #[serde(default)]
+        pub extension: Option<String>,
+
+        /// When true, inline wrapper files export the merged input map as shell
+        /// environment variables (`PARAM_*` and bare names) before executing the
+        /// script body.
+        #[serde(default)]
+        pub inject_shell_helpers: bool,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
+    #[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+    pub enum InlineExecutionStrategy {
+        #[default]
+        Direct,
+        TempFile,
+    }
+
     /// Describes the interpreter binary and how it invokes action scripts.
     #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
     pub struct InterpreterConfig {

crates/common/src/mq/messages.rs

@@ -481,9 +481,8 @@ pub struct PackRegisteredPayload {
 
 /// Payload for ExecutionCancelRequested message
 ///
-/// Sent by the API to the worker that is running a specific execution,
+/// Sent by the API or executor to the worker that is running a specific
-/// instructing it to gracefully terminate the process (SIGINT, then SIGTERM
+/// execution, instructing it to terminate the process promptly.
-/// after a grace period).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ExecutionCancelRequestedPayload {
     /// Execution ID to cancel

crates/common/src/pack_registry/loader.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 //! Pack Component Loader
 //!
-//! Reads runtime, action, trigger, and sensor YAML definitions from a pack directory
+//! Reads permission set, runtime, action, trigger, and sensor YAML definitions from a pack directory
 //! and registers them in the database. This is the Rust-native equivalent of
 //! the Python `load_core_pack.py` script used during init-packs.
 //!
 //! Components are loaded in dependency order:
-//! 1. Runtimes (no dependencies)
+//! 1. Permission sets (no dependencies)
-//! 2. Triggers (no dependencies)
+//! 2. Runtimes (no dependencies)
-//! 3. Actions (depend on runtime; workflow actions also create workflow_definition records)
+//! 3. Triggers (no dependencies)
-//! 4. Sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
+//! 4. Actions (depend on runtime; workflow actions also create workflow_definition records)
+//! 5. Sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
 //!
 //! All loaders use **upsert** semantics: if an entity with the same ref already
 //! exists it is updated in place (preserving its database ID); otherwise a new
@@ -38,6 +39,9 @@ use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 use crate::error::{Error, Result};
 use crate::models::Id;
 use crate::repositories::action::{ActionRepository, UpdateActionInput};
+use crate::repositories::identity::{
+    CreatePermissionSetInput, PermissionSetRepository, UpdatePermissionSetInput,
+};
 use crate::repositories::runtime::{CreateRuntimeInput, RuntimeRepository, UpdateRuntimeInput};
 use crate::repositories::runtime_version::{
     CreateRuntimeVersionInput, RuntimeVersionRepository, UpdateRuntimeVersionInput,
@@ -56,6 +60,12 @@ use crate::workflow::parser::parse_workflow_yaml;
 /// Result of loading pack components into the database.
 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
 pub struct PackLoadResult {
+    /// Number of permission sets created
+    pub permission_sets_loaded: usize,
+    /// Number of permission sets updated
+    pub permission_sets_updated: usize,
+    /// Number of permission sets skipped
+    pub permission_sets_skipped: usize,
     /// Number of runtimes created
     pub runtimes_loaded: usize,
     /// Number of runtimes updated (already existed)
@@ -88,15 +98,27 @@ pub struct PackLoadResult {
 
 impl PackLoadResult {
     pub fn total_loaded(&self) -> usize {
-        self.runtimes_loaded + self.triggers_loaded + self.actions_loaded + self.sensors_loaded
+        self.permission_sets_loaded
+            + self.runtimes_loaded
+            + self.triggers_loaded
+            + self.actions_loaded
+            + self.sensors_loaded
     }
 
     pub fn total_skipped(&self) -> usize {
-        self.runtimes_skipped + self.triggers_skipped + self.actions_skipped + self.sensors_skipped
+        self.permission_sets_skipped
+            + self.runtimes_skipped
+            + self.triggers_skipped
+            + self.actions_skipped
+            + self.sensors_skipped
     }
 
     pub fn total_updated(&self) -> usize {
-        self.runtimes_updated + self.triggers_updated + self.actions_updated + self.sensors_updated
+        self.permission_sets_updated
+            + self.runtimes_updated
+            + self.triggers_updated
+            + self.actions_updated
+            + self.sensors_updated
     }
 }
 
@@ -132,22 +154,26 @@ impl<'a> PackComponentLoader<'a> {
             pack_dir.display()
         );
 
-        // 1. Load runtimes first (no dependencies)
+        // 1. Load permission sets first (no dependencies)
+        let permission_set_refs = self.load_permission_sets(pack_dir, &mut result).await?;
+
+        // 2. Load runtimes (no dependencies)
         let runtime_refs = self.load_runtimes(pack_dir, &mut result).await?;
 
-        // 2. Load triggers (no dependencies)
+        // 3. Load triggers (no dependencies)
         let (trigger_ids, trigger_refs) = self.load_triggers(pack_dir, &mut result).await?;
 
-        // 3. Load actions (depend on runtime)
+        // 4. Load actions (depend on runtime)
         let action_refs = self.load_actions(pack_dir, &mut result).await?;
 
-        // 4. Load sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
+        // 5. Load sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
         let sensor_refs = self
             .load_sensors(pack_dir, &trigger_ids, &mut result)
             .await?;
 
-        // 5. Clean up entities that are no longer in the pack's YAML files
+        // 6. Clean up entities that are no longer in the pack's YAML files
         self.cleanup_removed_entities(
+            &permission_set_refs,
             &runtime_refs,
             &trigger_refs,
             &action_refs,
@@ -169,6 +195,146 @@ impl<'a> PackComponentLoader<'a> {
         Ok(result)
     }
 
+    /// Load permission set definitions from `pack_dir/permission_sets/*.yaml`.
+    ///
+    /// Permission sets are pack-scoped authorization metadata. Their `grants`
+    /// payload is stored verbatim and interpreted by the API authorization
+    /// layer at request time.
+    async fn load_permission_sets(
+        &self,
+        pack_dir: &Path,
+        result: &mut PackLoadResult,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        let permission_sets_dir = pack_dir.join("permission_sets");
+        let mut loaded_refs = Vec::new();
+
+        if !permission_sets_dir.exists() {
+            info!(
+                "No permission_sets directory found for pack '{}'",
+                self.pack_ref
+            );
+            return Ok(loaded_refs);
+        }
+
+        let yaml_files = read_yaml_files(&permission_sets_dir)?;
+        info!(
+            "Found {} permission set definition(s) for pack '{}'",
+            yaml_files.len(),
+            self.pack_ref
+        );
+
+        for (filename, content) in &yaml_files {
+            let data: serde_yaml_ng::Value = serde_yaml_ng::from_str(content).map_err(|e| {
+                Error::validation(format!(
+                    "Failed to parse permission set YAML {}: {}",
+                    filename, e
+                ))
+            })?;
+
+            let permission_set_ref = match data.get("ref").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+                Some(r) => r.to_string(),
+                None => {
+                    let msg = format!(
+                        "Permission set YAML {} missing 'ref' field, skipping",
+                        filename
+                    );
+                    warn!("{}", msg);
+                    result.warnings.push(msg);
+                    result.permission_sets_skipped += 1;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            };
+
+            let label = data
+                .get("label")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .map(|s| s.to_string());
+
+            let description = data
+                .get("description")
+                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+                .map(|s| s.to_string());
+
+            let grants = data
+                .get("grants")
+                .and_then(|v| serde_json::to_value(v).ok())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::json!([]));
+
+            if !grants.is_array() {
+                let msg = format!(
+                    "Permission set '{}' has non-array 'grants', skipping",
+                    permission_set_ref
+                );
+                warn!("{}", msg);
+                result.warnings.push(msg);
+                result.permission_sets_skipped += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if let Some(existing) =
+                PermissionSetRepository::find_by_ref(self.pool, &permission_set_ref).await?
+            {
+                let update_input = UpdatePermissionSetInput {
+                    label,
+                    description,
+                    grants: Some(grants),
+                };
+
+                match PermissionSetRepository::update(self.pool, existing.id, update_input).await {
+                    Ok(_) => {
+                        info!(
+                            "Updated permission set '{}' (ID: {})",
+                            permission_set_ref, existing.id
+                        );
+                        result.permission_sets_updated += 1;
+                    }
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        let msg = format!(
+                            "Failed to update permission set '{}': {}",
+                            permission_set_ref, e
+                        );
+                        warn!("{}", msg);
+                        result.warnings.push(msg);
+                        result.permission_sets_skipped += 1;
+                    }
+                }
+                loaded_refs.push(permission_set_ref);
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            let input = CreatePermissionSetInput {
+                r#ref: permission_set_ref.clone(),
+                pack: Some(self.pack_id),
+                pack_ref: Some(self.pack_ref.clone()),
+                label,
+                description,
+                grants,
+            };
+
+            match PermissionSetRepository::create(self.pool, input).await {
+                Ok(permission_set) => {
+                    info!(
+                        "Created permission set '{}' (ID: {})",
+                        permission_set_ref, permission_set.id
+                    );
+                    result.permission_sets_loaded += 1;
+                    loaded_refs.push(permission_set_ref);
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    let msg = format!(
+                        "Failed to create permission set '{}': {}",
+                        permission_set_ref, e
+                    );
+                    warn!("{}", msg);
+                    result.warnings.push(msg);
+                    result.permission_sets_skipped += 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(loaded_refs)
+    }
+
     /// Load runtime definitions from `pack_dir/runtimes/*.yaml`.
     ///
     /// Runtimes define how actions and sensors are executed (interpreter,
@@ -1308,12 +1474,37 @@ impl<'a> PackComponentLoader<'a> {
     /// removed.
     async fn cleanup_removed_entities(
         &self,
+        permission_set_refs: &[String],
         runtime_refs: &[String],
         trigger_refs: &[String],
         action_refs: &[String],
         sensor_refs: &[String],
         result: &mut PackLoadResult,
     ) {
+        match PermissionSetRepository::delete_by_pack_excluding(
+            self.pool,
+            self.pack_id,
+            permission_set_refs,
+        )
+        .await
+        {
+            Ok(count) => {
+                if count > 0 {
+                    info!(
+                        "Removed {} stale permission set(s) from pack '{}'",
+                        count, self.pack_ref
+                    );
+                    result.removed += count as usize;
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(
+                    "Failed to clean up stale permission sets for pack '{}': {}",
+                    self.pack_ref, e
+                );
+            }
+        }
+
         // Clean up sensors first (they depend on triggers/runtimes)
         match SensorRepository::delete_by_pack_excluding(self.pool, self.pack_id, sensor_refs).await
         {

crates/common/src/rbac.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+//! Role-based access control (RBAC) model and evaluator.
+//!
+//! Permission sets store `grants` as a JSON array of [`Grant`].
+//! This module defines the canonical grant schema and matching logic.
+
+use crate::models::{ArtifactVisibility, Id, OwnerType};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value as JsonValue;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum Resource {
+    Packs,
+    Actions,
+    Rules,
+    Triggers,
+    Executions,
+    Events,
+    Enforcements,
+    Inquiries,
+    Keys,
+    Artifacts,
+    Workflows,
+    Webhooks,
+    Analytics,
+    History,
+    Identities,
+    Permissions,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum Action {
+    Read,
+    Create,
+    Update,
+    Delete,
+    Execute,
+    Cancel,
+    Respond,
+    Manage,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum OwnerConstraint {
+    #[serde(rename = "self")]
+    SelfOnly,
+    Any,
+    None,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum ExecutionScopeConstraint {
+    #[serde(rename = "self")]
+    SelfOnly,
+    Descendants,
+    Any,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default, PartialEq)]
+pub struct GrantConstraints {
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub pack_refs: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub owner: Option<OwnerConstraint>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub owner_types: Option<Vec<OwnerType>>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub visibility: Option<Vec<ArtifactVisibility>>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub execution_scope: Option<ExecutionScopeConstraint>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub refs: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub ids: Option<Vec<Id>>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub encrypted: Option<bool>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub attributes: Option<HashMap<String, JsonValue>>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct Grant {
+    pub resource: Resource,
+    pub actions: Vec<Action>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub constraints: Option<GrantConstraints>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct AuthorizationContext {
+    pub identity_id: Id,
+    pub identity_attributes: HashMap<String, JsonValue>,
+    pub target_id: Option<Id>,
+    pub target_ref: Option<String>,
+    pub pack_ref: Option<String>,
+    pub owner_identity_id: Option<Id>,
+    pub owner_type: Option<OwnerType>,
+    pub visibility: Option<ArtifactVisibility>,
+    pub encrypted: Option<bool>,
+    pub execution_owner_identity_id: Option<Id>,
+    pub execution_ancestor_identity_ids: Vec<Id>,
+}
+
+impl AuthorizationContext {
+    pub fn new(identity_id: Id) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            identity_id,
+            identity_attributes: HashMap::new(),
+            target_id: None,
+            target_ref: None,
+            pack_ref: None,
+            owner_identity_id: None,
+            owner_type: None,
+            visibility: None,
+            encrypted: None,
+            execution_owner_identity_id: None,
+            execution_ancestor_identity_ids: Vec::new(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Grant {
+    pub fn allows(&self, resource: Resource, action: Action, ctx: &AuthorizationContext) -> bool {
+        self.resource == resource && self.actions.contains(&action) && self.constraints_match(ctx)
+    }
+
+    fn constraints_match(&self, ctx: &AuthorizationContext) -> bool {
+        let Some(constraints) = &self.constraints else {
+            return true;
+        };
+
+        if let Some(pack_refs) = &constraints.pack_refs {
+            let Some(pack_ref) = &ctx.pack_ref else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if !pack_refs.contains(pack_ref) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(owner) = constraints.owner {
+            let owner_match = match owner {
+                OwnerConstraint::SelfOnly => ctx.owner_identity_id == Some(ctx.identity_id),
+                OwnerConstraint::Any => true,
+                OwnerConstraint::None => ctx.owner_identity_id.is_none(),
+            };
+            if !owner_match {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(owner_types) = &constraints.owner_types {
+            let Some(owner_type) = ctx.owner_type else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if !owner_types.contains(&owner_type) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(visibility) = &constraints.visibility {
+            let Some(target_visibility) = ctx.visibility else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if !visibility.contains(&target_visibility) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(execution_scope) = constraints.execution_scope {
+            let execution_match = match execution_scope {
+                ExecutionScopeConstraint::SelfOnly => {
+                    ctx.execution_owner_identity_id == Some(ctx.identity_id)
+                }
+                ExecutionScopeConstraint::Descendants => {
+                    ctx.execution_owner_identity_id == Some(ctx.identity_id)
+                        || ctx
+                            .execution_ancestor_identity_ids
+                            .contains(&ctx.identity_id)
+                }
+                ExecutionScopeConstraint::Any => true,
+            };
+            if !execution_match {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(refs) = &constraints.refs {
+            let Some(target_ref) = &ctx.target_ref else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if !refs.contains(target_ref) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(ids) = &constraints.ids {
+            let Some(target_id) = ctx.target_id else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if !ids.contains(&target_id) {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(encrypted) = constraints.encrypted {
+            let Some(target_encrypted) = ctx.encrypted else {
+                return false;
+            };
+            if encrypted != target_encrypted {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(attributes) = &constraints.attributes {
+            for (key, expected_value) in attributes {
+                let Some(actual_value) = ctx.identity_attributes.get(key) else {
+                    return false;
+                };
+                if actual_value != expected_value {
+                    return false;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::json;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn grant_without_constraints_allows() {
+        let grant = Grant {
+            resource: Resource::Actions,
+            actions: vec![Action::Read],
+            constraints: None,
+        };
+        let ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(42);
+        assert!(grant.allows(Resource::Actions, Action::Read, &ctx));
+        assert!(!grant.allows(Resource::Actions, Action::Create, &ctx));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_constraint_owner_type_and_encrypted() {
+        let grant = Grant {
+            resource: Resource::Keys,
+            actions: vec![Action::Read],
+            constraints: Some(GrantConstraints {
+                owner_types: Some(vec![OwnerType::System]),
+                encrypted: Some(false),
+                ..Default::default()
+            }),
+        };
+
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(1);
+        ctx.owner_type = Some(OwnerType::System);
+        ctx.encrypted = Some(false);
+        assert!(grant.allows(Resource::Keys, Action::Read, &ctx));
+
+        ctx.encrypted = Some(true);
+        assert!(!grant.allows(Resource::Keys, Action::Read, &ctx));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn attributes_constraint_requires_exact_value_match() {
+        let grant = Grant {
+            resource: Resource::Packs,
+            actions: vec![Action::Read],
+            constraints: Some(GrantConstraints {
+                attributes: Some(HashMap::from([("team".to_string(), json!("platform"))])),
+                ..Default::default()
+            }),
+        };
+
+        let mut ctx = AuthorizationContext::new(1);
+        ctx.identity_attributes
+            .insert("team".to_string(), json!("platform"));
+        assert!(grant.allows(Resource::Packs, Action::Read, &ctx));
+
+        ctx.identity_attributes
+            .insert("team".to_string(), json!("infra"));
+        assert!(!grant.allows(Resource::Packs, Action::Read, &ctx));
+    }
+}

crates/common/src/repositories/identity.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use crate::models::{identity::*, Id, JsonDict};
 use crate::Result;
 use sqlx::{Executor, Postgres, QueryBuilder};
 
-use super::{Create, Delete, FindById, List, Repository, Update};
+use super::{Create, Delete, FindById, FindByRef, List, Repository, Update};
 
 pub struct IdentityRepository;
 
@@ -200,6 +200,22 @@ impl FindById for PermissionSetRepository {
     }
 }
 
+#[async_trait::async_trait]
+impl FindByRef for PermissionSetRepository {
+    async fn find_by_ref<'e, E>(executor: E, ref_str: &str) -> Result<Option<Self::Entity>>
+    where
+        E: Executor<'e, Database = Postgres> + 'e,
+    {
+        sqlx::query_as::<_, PermissionSet>(
+            "SELECT id, ref, pack, pack_ref, label, description, grants, created, updated FROM permission_set WHERE ref = $1"
+        )
+        .bind(ref_str)
+        .fetch_optional(executor)
+        .await
+        .map_err(Into::into)
+    }
+}
+
 #[async_trait::async_trait]
 impl List for PermissionSetRepository {
     async fn list<'e, E>(executor: E) -> Result<Vec<Self::Entity>>
@@ -287,6 +303,54 @@ impl Delete for PermissionSetRepository {
     }
 }
 
+impl PermissionSetRepository {
+    pub async fn find_by_identity<'e, E>(executor: E, identity_id: Id) -> Result<Vec<PermissionSet>>
+    where
+        E: Executor<'e, Database = Postgres> + 'e,
+    {
+        sqlx::query_as::<_, PermissionSet>(
+            "SELECT ps.id, ps.ref, ps.pack, ps.pack_ref, ps.label, ps.description, ps.grants, ps.created, ps.updated
+             FROM permission_set ps
+             INNER JOIN permission_assignment pa ON pa.permset = ps.id
+             WHERE pa.identity = $1
+             ORDER BY ps.ref ASC",
+        )
+        .bind(identity_id)
+        .fetch_all(executor)
+        .await
+        .map_err(Into::into)
+    }
+
+    /// Delete permission sets belonging to a pack whose refs are NOT in the given set.
+    ///
+    /// Used during pack reinstallation to clean up permission sets that were
+    /// removed from the pack's metadata. Associated permission assignments are
+    /// cascade-deleted by the FK constraint.
+    pub async fn delete_by_pack_excluding<'e, E>(
+        executor: E,
+        pack_id: Id,
+        keep_refs: &[String],
+    ) -> Result<u64>
+    where
+        E: Executor<'e, Database = Postgres> + 'e,
+    {
+        let result = if keep_refs.is_empty() {
+            sqlx::query("DELETE FROM permission_set WHERE pack = $1")
+                .bind(pack_id)
+                .execute(executor)
+                .await?
+        } else {
+            sqlx::query("DELETE FROM permission_set WHERE pack = $1 AND ref != ALL($2)")
+                .bind(pack_id)
+                .bind(keep_refs)
+                .execute(executor)
+                .await?
+        };
+
+        Ok(result.rows_affected())
+    }
+}
+
 // Permission Assignment Repository
 pub struct PermissionAssignmentRepository;
 

crates/executor/src/execution_manager.rs

@@ -21,13 +21,17 @@ use anyhow::Result;
 use attune_common::{
     models::{enums::ExecutionStatus, Execution},
     mq::{
-        Consumer, ExecutionRequestedPayload, ExecutionStatusChangedPayload, MessageEnvelope,
+        Consumer, ExecutionCancelRequestedPayload, ExecutionRequestedPayload,
-        MessageType, Publisher,
+        ExecutionStatusChangedPayload, MessageEnvelope, MessageType, Publisher,
     },
     repositories::{
-        execution::{CreateExecutionInput, ExecutionRepository},
+        execution::{CreateExecutionInput, ExecutionRepository, UpdateExecutionInput},
-        Create, FindById,
+        workflow::{
+            UpdateWorkflowExecutionInput, WorkflowDefinitionRepository, WorkflowExecutionRepository,
+        },
+        Create, FindById, Update,
     },
+    workflow::{CancellationPolicy, WorkflowDefinition},
 };
 
 use sqlx::PgPool;
@@ -116,8 +120,18 @@ impl ExecutionManager {
                     "Execution {} reached terminal state: {:?}, handling orchestration",
                     execution_id, status
                 );
+                if status == ExecutionStatus::Cancelled {
+                    Self::handle_workflow_cancellation(pool, publisher, &execution).await?;
+                }
                 Self::handle_completion(pool, publisher, &execution).await?;
             }
+            ExecutionStatus::Canceling => {
+                debug!(
+                    "Execution {} entered canceling state; checking for workflow child cancellation",
+                    execution_id
+                );
+                Self::handle_workflow_cancellation(pool, publisher, &execution).await?;
+            }
             ExecutionStatus::Running => {
                 debug!(
                     "Execution {} now running (worker has updated DB)",
@@ -135,6 +149,202 @@ impl ExecutionManager {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    async fn handle_workflow_cancellation(
+        pool: &PgPool,
+        publisher: &Publisher,
+        execution: &Execution,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let Some(_) = WorkflowExecutionRepository::find_by_execution(pool, execution.id).await?
+        else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+
+        let policy = Self::resolve_cancellation_policy(pool, execution.id).await;
+        Self::cancel_workflow_children_with_policy(pool, publisher, execution.id, policy).await
+    }
+
+    async fn resolve_cancellation_policy(
+        pool: &PgPool,
+        parent_execution_id: i64,
+    ) -> CancellationPolicy {
+        let wf_exec =
+            match WorkflowExecutionRepository::find_by_execution(pool, parent_execution_id).await {
+                Ok(Some(wf)) => wf,
+                _ => return CancellationPolicy::default(),
+            };
+
+        let wf_def =
+            match WorkflowDefinitionRepository::find_by_id(pool, wf_exec.workflow_def).await {
+                Ok(Some(def)) => def,
+                _ => return CancellationPolicy::default(),
+            };
+
+        match serde_json::from_value::<WorkflowDefinition>(wf_def.definition) {
+            Ok(def) => def.cancellation_policy,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(
+                    "Failed to deserialize workflow definition for workflow_def {}: {}. Falling back to default cancellation policy.",
+                    wf_exec.workflow_def, e
+                );
+                CancellationPolicy::default()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn cancel_workflow_children_with_policy(
+        pool: &PgPool,
+        publisher: &Publisher,
+        parent_execution_id: i64,
+        policy: CancellationPolicy,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let children: Vec<Execution> = sqlx::query_as::<_, Execution>(&format!(
+            "SELECT {} FROM execution WHERE parent = $1 AND status NOT IN ('completed', 'failed', 'timeout', 'cancelled', 'abandoned')",
+            attune_common::repositories::execution::SELECT_COLUMNS
+        ))
+        .bind(parent_execution_id)
+        .fetch_all(pool)
+        .await?;
+
+        if children.is_empty() {
+            return Self::finalize_cancelled_workflow_if_idle(pool, parent_execution_id).await;
+        }
+
+        info!(
+            "Executor cascading cancellation from workflow execution {} to {} child execution(s) with policy {:?}",
+            parent_execution_id,
+            children.len(),
+            policy,
+        );
+
+        for child in &children {
+            let child_id = child.id;
+
+            if matches!(
+                child.status,
+                ExecutionStatus::Requested
+                    | ExecutionStatus::Scheduling
+                    | ExecutionStatus::Scheduled
+            ) {
+                let update = UpdateExecutionInput {
+                    status: Some(ExecutionStatus::Cancelled),
+                    result: Some(serde_json::json!({
+                        "error": "Cancelled: parent workflow execution was cancelled"
+                    })),
+                    ..Default::default()
+                };
+                ExecutionRepository::update(pool, child_id, update).await?;
+            } else if matches!(
+                child.status,
+                ExecutionStatus::Running | ExecutionStatus::Canceling
+            ) {
+                match policy {
+                    CancellationPolicy::CancelRunning => {
+                        if child.status != ExecutionStatus::Canceling {
+                            let update = UpdateExecutionInput {
+                                status: Some(ExecutionStatus::Canceling),
+                                ..Default::default()
+                            };
+                            ExecutionRepository::update(pool, child_id, update).await?;
+                        }
+
+                        if let Some(worker_id) = child.executor {
+                            Self::send_cancel_to_worker(publisher, child_id, worker_id).await?;
+                        } else {
+                            warn!(
+                                "Workflow child execution {} is {:?} but has no assigned worker",
+                                child_id, child.status
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+                    CancellationPolicy::AllowFinish => {
+                        info!(
+                            "AllowFinish policy: leaving running workflow child execution {} alone",
+                            child_id
+                        );
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            Box::pin(Self::cancel_workflow_children_with_policy(
+                pool, publisher, child_id, policy,
+            ))
+            .await?;
+        }
+
+        if let Some(wf_exec) =
+            WorkflowExecutionRepository::find_by_execution(pool, parent_execution_id).await?
+        {
+            if !matches!(
+                wf_exec.status,
+                ExecutionStatus::Completed | ExecutionStatus::Failed | ExecutionStatus::Cancelled
+            ) {
+                let wf_update = UpdateWorkflowExecutionInput {
+                    status: Some(ExecutionStatus::Cancelled),
+                    error_message: Some(
+                        "Cancelled: parent workflow execution was cancelled".to_string(),
+                    ),
+                    current_tasks: Some(vec![]),
+                    ..Default::default()
+                };
+                WorkflowExecutionRepository::update(pool, wf_exec.id, wf_update).await?;
+            }
+        }
+
+        Self::finalize_cancelled_workflow_if_idle(pool, parent_execution_id).await
+    }
+
+    async fn finalize_cancelled_workflow_if_idle(
+        pool: &PgPool,
+        parent_execution_id: i64,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let still_running: Vec<Execution> = sqlx::query_as::<_, Execution>(&format!(
+            "SELECT {} FROM execution WHERE parent = $1 AND status IN ('running', 'canceling', 'scheduling', 'scheduled', 'requested')",
+            attune_common::repositories::execution::SELECT_COLUMNS
+        ))
+        .bind(parent_execution_id)
+        .fetch_all(pool)
+        .await?;
+
+        if still_running.is_empty() {
+            let update = UpdateExecutionInput {
+                status: Some(ExecutionStatus::Cancelled),
+                result: Some(serde_json::json!({
+                    "error": "Workflow cancelled",
+                    "succeeded": false,
+                })),
+                ..Default::default()
+            };
+            let _ = ExecutionRepository::update(pool, parent_execution_id, update).await?;
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn send_cancel_to_worker(
+        publisher: &Publisher,
+        execution_id: i64,
+        worker_id: i64,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let payload = ExecutionCancelRequestedPayload {
+            execution_id,
+            worker_id,
+        };
+
+        let envelope = MessageEnvelope::new(MessageType::ExecutionCancelRequested, payload)
+            .with_source("executor-service")
+            .with_correlation_id(uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
+
+        publisher
+            .publish_envelope_with_routing(
+                &envelope,
+                "attune.executions",
+                &format!("execution.cancel.worker.{}", worker_id),
+            )
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// Parse execution status from string
     fn parse_execution_status(status: &str) -> Result<ExecutionStatus> {
         match status.to_lowercase().as_str() {

crates/worker/src/executor.rs

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ impl ActionExecutor {
     /// Execute an action for the given execution, with cancellation support.
     ///
     /// When the `cancel_token` is triggered, the running process receives
-    /// SIGINT → SIGTERM → SIGKILL with escalating grace periods.
+    /// SIGTERM → SIGKILL with a short grace period.
     pub async fn execute_with_cancel(
         &self,
         execution_id: i64,
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ impl ActionExecutor {
         };
 
         // Attach the cancellation token so the process executor can monitor it
-        context.cancel_token = Some(cancel_token);
+        context.cancel_token = Some(cancel_token.clone());
 
         // Execute the action
         // Note: execute_action should rarely return Err - most failures should be
@@ -181,7 +181,16 @@ impl ActionExecutor {
             execution_id, result.exit_code, result.error, is_success
         );
 
-        if is_success {
+        let was_cancelled = cancel_token.is_cancelled()
+            || result
+                .error
+                .as_deref()
+                .is_some_and(|e| e.contains("cancelled"));
+
+        if was_cancelled {
+            self.handle_execution_cancelled(execution_id, &result)
+                .await?;
+        } else if is_success {
             self.handle_execution_success(execution_id, &result).await?;
         } else {
             self.handle_execution_failure(execution_id, Some(&result), None)
@@ -913,6 +922,51 @@ impl ActionExecutor {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    async fn handle_execution_cancelled(
+        &self,
+        execution_id: i64,
+        result: &ExecutionResult,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let exec_dir = self.artifact_manager.get_execution_dir(execution_id);
+        let mut result_data = serde_json::json!({
+            "succeeded": false,
+            "cancelled": true,
+            "exit_code": result.exit_code,
+            "duration_ms": result.duration_ms,
+            "error": result.error.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "Execution cancelled by user".to_string()),
+        });
+
+        if !result.stdout.is_empty() {
+            result_data["stdout"] = serde_json::json!(result.stdout);
+        }
+
+        if !result.stderr.trim().is_empty() {
+            let stderr_path = exec_dir.join("stderr.log");
+            result_data["stderr_log"] = serde_json::json!(stderr_path.to_string_lossy());
+        }
+
+        if result.stdout_truncated {
+            result_data["stdout_truncated"] = serde_json::json!(true);
+            result_data["stdout_bytes_truncated"] =
+                serde_json::json!(result.stdout_bytes_truncated);
+        }
+        if result.stderr_truncated {
+            result_data["stderr_truncated"] = serde_json::json!(true);
+            result_data["stderr_bytes_truncated"] =
+                serde_json::json!(result.stderr_bytes_truncated);
+        }
+
+        let input = UpdateExecutionInput {
+            status: Some(ExecutionStatus::Cancelled),
+            result: Some(result_data),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+
+        ExecutionRepository::update(&self.pool, execution_id, input).await?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// Update execution status
     async fn update_execution_status(
         &self,

crates/worker/src/runtime/local.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! Local Runtime Module
 //!
-//! Provides local execution capabilities by combining Process and Shell runtimes.
+//! Provides local execution capabilities by combining Process and Native runtimes.
 //! This module serves as a facade for all local process-based execution.
 //!
 //! The `ProcessRuntime` is used for Python (and other interpreted languages),
@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@
 
 use super::native::NativeRuntime;
 use super::process::ProcessRuntime;
-use super::shell::ShellRuntime;
 use super::{ExecutionContext, ExecutionResult, Runtime, RuntimeError, RuntimeResult};
 use async_trait::async_trait;
-use attune_common::models::runtime::{InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig};
+use attune_common::models::runtime::{
+    InlineExecutionConfig, InlineExecutionStrategy, InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+};
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use tracing::{debug, info};
 
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ use tracing::{debug, info};
 pub struct LocalRuntime {
     native: NativeRuntime,
     python: ProcessRuntime,
-    shell: ShellRuntime,
+    shell: ProcessRuntime,
 }
 
 impl LocalRuntime {
@@ -34,6 +35,23 @@ impl LocalRuntime {
                 args: vec![],
                 file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
             },
+            inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
+            environment: None,
+            dependencies: None,
+            env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
+        };
+
+        let shell_config = RuntimeExecutionConfig {
+            interpreter: InterpreterConfig {
+                binary: "/bin/bash".to_string(),
+                args: vec![],
+                file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
+            },
+            inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig {
+                strategy: InlineExecutionStrategy::TempFile,
+                extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
+                inject_shell_helpers: true,
+            },
             environment: None,
             dependencies: None,
             env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
@@ -47,7 +65,12 @@ impl LocalRuntime {
                 PathBuf::from("/opt/attune/packs"),
                 PathBuf::from("/opt/attune/runtime_envs"),
             ),
-            shell: ShellRuntime::new(),
+            shell: ProcessRuntime::new(
+                "shell".to_string(),
+                shell_config,
+                PathBuf::from("/opt/attune/packs"),
+                PathBuf::from("/opt/attune/runtime_envs"),
+            ),
         }
     }
 
@@ -55,7 +78,7 @@ impl LocalRuntime {
     pub fn with_runtimes(
         native: NativeRuntime,
         python: ProcessRuntime,
-        shell: ShellRuntime,
+        shell: ProcessRuntime,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
             native,
@@ -76,7 +99,10 @@ impl LocalRuntime {
             );
             Ok(&self.python)
         } else if self.shell.can_execute(context) {
-            debug!("Selected Shell runtime for action: {}", context.action_ref);
+            debug!(
+                "Selected Shell (ProcessRuntime) for action: {}",
+                context.action_ref
+            );
             Ok(&self.shell)
         } else {
             Err(RuntimeError::RuntimeNotFound(format!(

crates/worker/src/runtime/mod.rs

@@ -159,9 +159,9 @@ pub struct ExecutionContext {
     /// Format for output parsing
     pub output_format: OutputFormat,
 
-    /// Optional cancellation token for graceful process termination.
+    /// Optional cancellation token for process termination.
-    /// When triggered, the executor sends SIGINT → SIGTERM → SIGKILL
+    /// When triggered, the executor sends SIGTERM → SIGKILL
-    /// with escalating grace periods.
+    /// with a short grace period.
     pub cancel_token: Option<CancellationToken>,
 }
 

crates/worker/src/runtime/process.rs

@@ -19,12 +19,18 @@ use super::{
     process_executor, ExecutionContext, ExecutionResult, Runtime, RuntimeError, RuntimeResult,
 };
 use async_trait::async_trait;
-use attune_common::models::runtime::{EnvironmentConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig};
+use attune_common::models::runtime::{
+    EnvironmentConfig, InlineExecutionStrategy, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use tokio::process::Command;
 use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
 
+fn bash_single_quote_escape(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.replace('\'', "'\\''")
+}
+
 /// A generic runtime driven by `RuntimeExecutionConfig` from the database.
 ///
 /// Each `ProcessRuntime` instance corresponds to a row in the `runtime` table.
@@ -437,6 +443,90 @@ impl ProcessRuntime {
     pub fn config(&self) -> &RuntimeExecutionConfig {
         &self.config
     }
+
+    fn build_shell_inline_wrapper(
+        &self,
+        merged_parameters: &HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
+        code: &str,
+    ) -> RuntimeResult<String> {
+        let mut script = String::new();
+        script.push_str("#!/bin/bash\n");
+        script.push_str("set -e\n\n");
+
+        script.push_str("# Action parameters\n");
+        for (key, value) in merged_parameters {
+            let value_str = match value {
+                serde_json::Value::String(s) => s.clone(),
+                serde_json::Value::Number(n) => n.to_string(),
+                serde_json::Value::Bool(b) => b.to_string(),
+                _ => serde_json::to_string(value)?,
+            };
+            let escaped = bash_single_quote_escape(&value_str);
+            script.push_str(&format!(
+                "export PARAM_{}='{}'\n",
+                key.to_uppercase(),
+                escaped
+            ));
+            script.push_str(&format!("export {}='{}'\n", key, escaped));
+        }
+        script.push('\n');
+        script.push_str("# Action code\n");
+        script.push_str(code);
+
+        Ok(script)
+    }
+
+    async fn materialize_inline_code(
+        &self,
+        execution_id: i64,
+        merged_parameters: &HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>,
+        code: &str,
+        effective_config: &RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+    ) -> RuntimeResult<(PathBuf, bool)> {
+        let inline_dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("attune").join("inline_actions");
+        tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&inline_dir).await.map_err(|e| {
+            RuntimeError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
+                "Failed to create inline action directory {}: {}",
+                inline_dir.display(),
+                e
+            ))
+        })?;
+
+        let extension = effective_config
+            .inline_execution
+            .extension
+            .as_deref()
+            .unwrap_or("");
+        let extension = if extension.is_empty() {
+            String::new()
+        } else if extension.starts_with('.') {
+            extension.to_string()
+        } else {
+            format!(".{}", extension)
+        };
+
+        let inline_path = inline_dir.join(format!("exec_{}{}", execution_id, extension));
+        let inline_code = if effective_config.inline_execution.inject_shell_helpers {
+            self.build_shell_inline_wrapper(merged_parameters, code)?
+        } else {
+            code.to_string()
+        };
+
+        tokio::fs::write(&inline_path, inline_code)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| {
+                RuntimeError::ExecutionFailed(format!(
+                    "Failed to write inline action file {}: {}",
+                    inline_path.display(),
+                    e
+                ))
+            })?;
+
+        Ok((
+            inline_path,
+            effective_config.inline_execution.inject_shell_helpers,
+        ))
+    }
 }
 
 #[async_trait]
@@ -661,7 +751,7 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
         };
         let prepared_params =
             parameter_passing::prepare_parameters(&merged_parameters, &mut env, param_config)?;
-        let parameters_stdin = prepared_params.stdin_content();
+        let mut parameters_stdin = prepared_params.stdin_content();
 
         // Determine working directory: use context override, or pack dir
         let working_dir = context
@@ -677,6 +767,7 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
             });
 
         // Build the command based on whether we have a file or inline code
+        let mut temp_inline_file: Option<PathBuf> = None;
         let cmd = if let Some(ref code_path) = context.code_path {
             // File-based execution: interpreter [args] <action_file>
             debug!("Executing file: {}", code_path.display());
@@ -688,13 +779,38 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
                 &env,
             )
         } else if let Some(ref code) = context.code {
-            // Inline code execution: interpreter -c <code>
+            match effective_config.inline_execution.strategy {
-            debug!("Executing inline code ({} bytes)", code.len());
+                InlineExecutionStrategy::Direct => {
-            let mut cmd = process_executor::build_inline_command(&interpreter, code, &env);
+                    debug!("Executing inline code directly ({} bytes)", code.len());
-            if let Some(dir) = working_dir {
+                    let mut cmd = process_executor::build_inline_command(&interpreter, code, &env);
-                cmd.current_dir(dir);
+                    if let Some(dir) = working_dir {
+                        cmd.current_dir(dir);
+                    }
+                    cmd
+                }
+                InlineExecutionStrategy::TempFile => {
+                    debug!("Executing inline code via temp file ({} bytes)", code.len());
+                    let (inline_path, consumes_parameters) = self
+                        .materialize_inline_code(
+                            context.execution_id,
+                            &merged_parameters,
+                            code,
+                            effective_config,
+                        )
+                        .await?;
+                    if consumes_parameters {
+                        parameters_stdin = None;
+                    }
+                    temp_inline_file = Some(inline_path.clone());
+                    process_executor::build_action_command(
+                        &interpreter,
+                        &effective_config.interpreter.args,
+                        &inline_path,
+                        working_dir,
+                        &env,
+                    )
+                }
             }
-            cmd
         } else {
             // No code_path and no inline code — try treating entry_point as a file
             // relative to the pack's actions directory
@@ -737,7 +853,7 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
 
         // Execute with streaming output capture (with optional cancellation support).
         // Secrets are already merged into parameters — no separate secrets arg needed.
-        process_executor::execute_streaming_cancellable(
+        let result = process_executor::execute_streaming_cancellable(
             cmd,
             &HashMap::new(),
             parameters_stdin,
@@ -747,7 +863,13 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
             context.output_format,
             context.cancel_token.clone(),
         )
-        .await
+        .await;
+
+        if let Some(path) = temp_inline_file {
+            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(path).await;
+        }
+
+        result
     }
 
     async fn setup(&self) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
@@ -836,7 +958,8 @@ impl Runtime for ProcessRuntime {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use attune_common::models::runtime::{
-        DependencyConfig, EnvironmentConfig, InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+        DependencyConfig, EnvironmentConfig, InlineExecutionConfig, InlineExecutionStrategy,
+        InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
     };
     use attune_common::models::{OutputFormat, ParameterDelivery, ParameterFormat};
     use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -849,6 +972,11 @@ mod tests {
                 args: vec![],
                 file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
             },
+            inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig {
+                strategy: InlineExecutionStrategy::TempFile,
+                extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
+                inject_shell_helpers: true,
+            },
             environment: None,
             dependencies: None,
             env_vars: HashMap::new(),
@@ -862,6 +990,7 @@ mod tests {
                 args: vec!["-u".to_string()],
                 file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
             },
+            inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
             environment: Some(EnvironmentConfig {
                 env_type: "virtualenv".to_string(),
                 dir_name: ".venv".to_string(),
@@ -1104,6 +1233,7 @@ mod tests {
                 args: vec![],
                 file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
             },
+            inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
             environment: None,
             dependencies: None,
             env_vars: HashMap::new(),
@@ -1183,6 +1313,53 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.stdout.contains("inline shell code"));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_execute_inline_code_with_merged_inputs() {
+        let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+
+        let runtime = ProcessRuntime::new(
+            "shell".to_string(),
+            make_shell_config(),
+            temp_dir.path().to_path_buf(),
+            temp_dir.path().join("runtime_envs"),
+        );
+
+        let context = ExecutionContext {
+            execution_id: 30,
+            action_ref: "adhoc.test_inputs".to_string(),
+            parameters: {
+                let mut map = HashMap::new();
+                map.insert("name".to_string(), serde_json::json!("Alice"));
+                map
+            },
+            env: HashMap::new(),
+            secrets: {
+                let mut map = HashMap::new();
+                map.insert("api_key".to_string(), serde_json::json!("secret-123"));
+                map
+            },
+            timeout: Some(10),
+            working_dir: None,
+            entry_point: "inline".to_string(),
+            code: Some("echo \"$name/$api_key/$PARAM_NAME/$PARAM_API_KEY\"".to_string()),
+            code_path: None,
+            runtime_name: Some("shell".to_string()),
+            runtime_config_override: None,
+            runtime_env_dir_suffix: None,
+            selected_runtime_version: None,
+            max_stdout_bytes: 1024 * 1024,
+            max_stderr_bytes: 1024 * 1024,
+            parameter_delivery: ParameterDelivery::default(),
+            parameter_format: ParameterFormat::default(),
+            output_format: OutputFormat::default(),
+            cancel_token: None,
+        };
+
+        let result = runtime.execute(context).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(result.exit_code, 0);
+        assert!(result.stdout.contains("Alice/secret-123/Alice/secret-123"));
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_execute_entry_point_fallback() {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();

crates/worker/src/runtime/process_executor.rs

@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@
 //!
 //! When a `CancellationToken` is provided, the executor monitors it alongside
 //! the running process. On cancellation:
-//! 1. SIGINT is sent to the process (allows graceful shutdown)
+//! 1. SIGTERM is sent to the process immediately
-//! 2. After a 10-second grace period, SIGTERM is sent if the process hasn't exited
+//! 2. After a 5-second grace period, SIGKILL is sent as a last resort
-//! 3. After another 5-second grace period, SIGKILL is sent as a last resort
 
 use super::{BoundedLogWriter, ExecutionResult, OutputFormat, RuntimeResult};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -71,7 +70,7 @@ pub async fn execute_streaming(
 /// - Writing parameters (with secrets merged in) to stdin
 /// - Streaming stdout/stderr with bounded log collection
 /// - Timeout management
-/// - Graceful cancellation via SIGINT → SIGTERM → SIGKILL escalation
+/// - Prompt cancellation via SIGTERM → SIGKILL escalation
 /// - Output format parsing (JSON, YAML, JSONL, text)
 ///
 /// # Arguments
@@ -199,35 +198,23 @@ pub async fn execute_streaming_cancellable(
             tokio::select! {
                 result = timed_wait => (result, false),
                 _ = token.cancelled() => {
-                    // Cancellation requested — escalate signals to the child process.
+                    // Cancellation requested — terminate the child process promptly.
-                    info!("Cancel signal received, sending SIGINT to process");
+                    info!("Cancel signal received, sending SIGTERM to process");
                     if let Some(pid) = child_pid {
-                        send_signal(pid, libc::SIGINT);
+                        send_signal(pid, libc::SIGTERM);
                     }
 
-                    // Grace period: wait up to 10s for the process to exit after SIGINT.
+                    // Grace period: wait up to 5s for the process to exit after SIGTERM.
-                    match timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10), child.wait()).await {
+                    match timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), child.wait()).await {
                         Ok(status) => (Ok(status), true),
                         Err(_) => {
-                            // Still alive — escalate to SIGTERM
+                            // Last resort — SIGKILL
-                            warn!("Process did not exit after SIGINT + 10s grace period, sending SIGTERM");
+                            warn!("Process did not exit after SIGTERM + 5s, sending SIGKILL");
                             if let Some(pid) = child_pid {
-                                send_signal(pid, libc::SIGTERM);
+                                send_signal(pid, libc::SIGKILL);
-                            }
-
-                            // Final grace period: wait up to 5s for SIGTERM
-                            match timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5), child.wait()).await {
-                                Ok(status) => (Ok(status), true),
-                                Err(_) => {
-                                    // Last resort — SIGKILL
-                                    warn!("Process did not exit after SIGTERM + 5s, sending SIGKILL");
-                                    if let Some(pid) = child_pid {
-                                        send_signal(pid, libc::SIGKILL);
-                                    }
-                                    // Wait indefinitely for the SIGKILL to take effect
-                                    (Ok(child.wait().await), true)
-                                }
                             }
+                            // Wait indefinitely for the SIGKILL to take effect
+                            (Ok(child.wait().await), true)
                         }
                     }
                 }

crates/worker/src/service.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use attune_common::runtime_detection::runtime_in_filter;
 use chrono::Utc;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use sqlx::PgPool;
-use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ use crate::registration::WorkerRegistration;
 use crate::runtime::local::LocalRuntime;
 use crate::runtime::native::NativeRuntime;
 use crate::runtime::process::ProcessRuntime;
-use crate::runtime::shell::ShellRuntime;
 use crate::runtime::RuntimeRegistry;
 use crate::secrets::SecretManager;
 use crate::version_verify;
@@ -89,8 +88,11 @@ pub struct WorkerService {
     in_flight_tasks: Arc<Mutex<JoinSet<()>>>,
     /// Maps execution ID → CancellationToken for running processes.
     /// When a cancel request arrives, the token is triggered, causing
-    /// the process executor to send SIGINT → SIGTERM → SIGKILL.
+    /// the process executor to send SIGTERM → SIGKILL.
     cancel_tokens: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<i64, CancellationToken>>>,
+    /// Tracks cancellation requests that arrived before the in-memory token
+    /// for an execution had been registered.
+    pending_cancellations: Arc<Mutex<HashSet<i64>>>,
 }
 
 impl WorkerService {
@@ -263,9 +265,29 @@ impl WorkerService {
         if runtime_registry.list_runtimes().is_empty() {
             info!("No runtimes loaded from database, registering built-in defaults");
 
-            // Shell runtime (always available)
+            // Shell runtime (always available) via generic ProcessRuntime
-            runtime_registry.register(Box::new(ShellRuntime::new()));
+            let shell_runtime = ProcessRuntime::new(
-            info!("Registered built-in Shell runtime");
+                "shell".to_string(),
+                attune_common::models::runtime::RuntimeExecutionConfig {
+                    interpreter: attune_common::models::runtime::InterpreterConfig {
+                        binary: "/bin/bash".to_string(),
+                        args: vec![],
+                        file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
+                    },
+                    inline_execution: attune_common::models::runtime::InlineExecutionConfig {
+                        strategy: attune_common::models::runtime::InlineExecutionStrategy::TempFile,
+                        extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
+                        inject_shell_helpers: true,
+                    },
+                    environment: None,
+                    dependencies: None,
+                    env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
+                },
+                packs_base_dir.clone(),
+                runtime_envs_dir.clone(),
+            );
+            runtime_registry.register(Box::new(shell_runtime));
+            info!("Registered built-in shell ProcessRuntime");
 
             // Native runtime (for compiled binaries)
             runtime_registry.register(Box::new(NativeRuntime::new()));
@@ -379,6 +401,7 @@ impl WorkerService {
             execution_semaphore: Arc::new(Semaphore::new(max_concurrent_tasks)),
             in_flight_tasks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(JoinSet::new())),
             cancel_tokens: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
+            pending_cancellations: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashSet::new())),
         })
     }
 
@@ -755,6 +778,7 @@ impl WorkerService {
         let semaphore = self.execution_semaphore.clone();
         let in_flight = self.in_flight_tasks.clone();
         let cancel_tokens = self.cancel_tokens.clone();
+        let pending_cancellations = self.pending_cancellations.clone();
 
         // Spawn the consumer loop as a background task so start() can return
         let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -768,6 +792,7 @@ impl WorkerService {
                         let semaphore = semaphore.clone();
                         let in_flight = in_flight.clone();
                         let cancel_tokens = cancel_tokens.clone();
+                        let pending_cancellations = pending_cancellations.clone();
 
                         async move {
                             let execution_id = envelope.payload.execution_id;
@@ -794,6 +819,16 @@ impl WorkerService {
                                 let mut tokens = cancel_tokens.lock().await;
                                 tokens.insert(execution_id, cancel_token.clone());
                             }
+                            {
+                                let pending = pending_cancellations.lock().await;
+                                if pending.contains(&execution_id) {
+                                    info!(
+                                        "Execution {} already had a pending cancel request; cancelling immediately",
+                                        execution_id
+                                    );
+                                    cancel_token.cancel();
+                                }
+                            }
 
                             // Spawn the actual execution as a background task so this
                             // handler returns immediately, acking the message and freeing
@@ -819,6 +854,8 @@ impl WorkerService {
                                 // Remove the cancel token now that execution is done
                                 let mut tokens = cancel_tokens.lock().await;
                                 tokens.remove(&execution_id);
+                                let mut pending = pending_cancellations.lock().await;
+                                pending.remove(&execution_id);
                             });
 
                             Ok(())
@@ -1060,6 +1097,7 @@ impl WorkerService {
 
         let consumer_for_task = consumer.clone();
         let cancel_tokens = self.cancel_tokens.clone();
+        let pending_cancellations = self.pending_cancellations.clone();
         let queue_name_for_log = queue_name.clone();
 
         let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -1071,11 +1109,17 @@ impl WorkerService {
                 .consume_with_handler(
                     move |envelope: MessageEnvelope<ExecutionCancelRequestedPayload>| {
                         let cancel_tokens = cancel_tokens.clone();
+                        let pending_cancellations = pending_cancellations.clone();
 
                         async move {
                             let execution_id = envelope.payload.execution_id;
                             info!("Received cancel request for execution {}", execution_id);
 
+                            {
+                                let mut pending = pending_cancellations.lock().await;
+                                pending.insert(execution_id);
+                            }
+
                             let tokens = cancel_tokens.lock().await;
                             if let Some(token) = tokens.get(&execution_id) {
                                 info!("Triggering cancellation for execution {}", execution_id);

crates/worker/tests/dependency_isolation_test.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 //! This keeps the pack directory clean and read-only.
 
 use attune_common::models::runtime::{
-    DependencyConfig, EnvironmentConfig, InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+    DependencyConfig, EnvironmentConfig, InlineExecutionConfig, InterpreterConfig,
+    RuntimeExecutionConfig,
 };
 use attune_worker::runtime::process::ProcessRuntime;
 use attune_worker::runtime::ExecutionContext;
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ fn make_python_config() -> RuntimeExecutionConfig {
             args: vec!["-u".to_string()],
             file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: Some(EnvironmentConfig {
             env_type: "virtualenv".to_string(),
             dir_name: ".venv".to_string(),
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ fn make_shell_config() -> RuntimeExecutionConfig {
             args: vec![],
             file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),

crates/worker/tests/log_truncation_test.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 //! Tests that verify stdout/stderr are properly truncated when they exceed
 //! configured size limits, preventing OOM issues with large output.
 
-use attune_common::models::runtime::{InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig};
+use attune_common::models::runtime::{
+    InlineExecutionConfig, InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+};
 use attune_worker::runtime::process::ProcessRuntime;
 use attune_worker::runtime::{ExecutionContext, Runtime, ShellRuntime};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@ fn make_python_process_runtime(packs_base_dir: PathBuf) -> ProcessRuntime {
             args: vec!["-u".to_string()],
             file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
@@ -270,6 +273,7 @@ async fn test_shell_process_runtime_truncation() {
             args: vec![],
             file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),

crates/worker/tests/security_tests.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 //! These tests verify that secrets are NOT exposed in process environment
 //! or command-line arguments, ensuring secure secret passing via stdin.
 
-use attune_common::models::runtime::{InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig};
+use attune_common::models::runtime::{
+    InlineExecutionConfig, InterpreterConfig, RuntimeExecutionConfig,
+};
 use attune_worker::runtime::process::ProcessRuntime;
 use attune_worker::runtime::shell::ShellRuntime;
 use attune_worker::runtime::{ExecutionContext, Runtime};
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ fn make_python_process_runtime(packs_base_dir: PathBuf) -> ProcessRuntime {
             args: vec!["-u".to_string()],
             file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
@@ -440,6 +443,7 @@ echo "PASS: No secrets in environment"
             args: vec![],
             file_extension: Some(".sh".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
@@ -520,6 +524,7 @@ print(json.dumps({"leaked": leaked}))
             args: vec!["-u".to_string()],
             file_extension: Some(".py".to_string()),
         },
+        inline_execution: InlineExecutionConfig::default(),
         environment: None,
         dependencies: None,
         env_vars: std::collections::HashMap::new(),

docker-compose.yaml

@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ services:
       SOURCE_PACKS_DIR: /source/packs
       TARGET_PACKS_DIR: /opt/attune/packs
       LOADER_SCRIPT: /scripts/load_core_pack.py
+      DEFAULT_ADMIN_LOGIN: test@attune.local
+      DEFAULT_ADMIN_PERMISSION_SET_REF: core.admin
     command: ["/bin/sh", "/init-packs.sh"]
     depends_on:
       migrations:

docker/init-packs.sh

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ TARGET_PACKS_DIR="${TARGET_PACKS_DIR:-/opt/attune/packs}"
 
 # Python loader script
 LOADER_SCRIPT="${LOADER_SCRIPT:-/scripts/load_core_pack.py}"
+DEFAULT_ADMIN_LOGIN="${DEFAULT_ADMIN_LOGIN:-}"
+DEFAULT_ADMIN_PERMISSION_SET_REF="${DEFAULT_ADMIN_PERMISSION_SET_REF:-core.admin}"
 
 echo ""
 echo -e "${BLUE}╔════════════════════════════════════════════════╗${NC}"
@@ -205,6 +207,63 @@ else
     echo -e "${BLUE}ℹ${NC} You can manually load them later"
 fi
 
+if [ -n "$DEFAULT_ADMIN_LOGIN" ] && [ "$LOADED_COUNT" -gt 0 ]; then
+    echo ""
+    echo -e "${BLUE}Bootstrapping local admin assignment...${NC}"
+    if python3 - <<PY
+import psycopg2
+import sys
+
+conn = psycopg2.connect(
+    host="${DB_HOST}",
+    port=${DB_PORT},
+    user="${DB_USER}",
+    password="${DB_PASSWORD}",
+    dbname="${DB_NAME}",
+)
+conn.autocommit = False
+
+try:
+    with conn.cursor() as cur:
+        cur.execute("SET search_path TO ${DB_SCHEMA}, public")
+        cur.execute("SELECT id FROM identity WHERE login = %s", ("${DEFAULT_ADMIN_LOGIN}",))
+        identity_row = cur.fetchone()
+        if identity_row is None:
+            print("  ⚠ Default admin identity not found; skipping assignment")
+            conn.rollback()
+            sys.exit(0)
+
+        cur.execute("SELECT id FROM permission_set WHERE ref = %s", ("${DEFAULT_ADMIN_PERMISSION_SET_REF}",))
+        permset_row = cur.fetchone()
+        if permset_row is None:
+            print("  ⚠ Default admin permission set not found; skipping assignment")
+            conn.rollback()
+            sys.exit(0)
+
+        cur.execute(
+            """
+            INSERT INTO permission_assignment (identity, permset)
+            VALUES (%s, %s)
+            ON CONFLICT (identity, permset) DO NOTHING
+            """,
+            (identity_row[0], permset_row[0]),
+        )
+    conn.commit()
+    print("  ✓ Default admin permission assignment ensured")
+except Exception as exc:
+    conn.rollback()
+    print(f"  ✗ Failed to ensure default admin assignment: {exc}")
+    sys.exit(1)
+finally:
+    conn.close()
+PY
+    then
+        :
+    else
+        exit 1
+    fi
+fi
+
 # Summary
 echo ""
 echo -e "${GREEN}╔════════════════════════════════════════════════╗${NC}"

packs/core/permission_sets/admin.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+ref: core.admin
+label: Admin
+description: Full administrative access across Attune resources.
+grants:
+  - resource: packs
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: actions
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete, execute]
+  - resource: rules
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: triggers
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: executions
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete, cancel]
+  - resource: events
+    actions: [read, create, delete]
+  - resource: enforcements
+    actions: [read, create, delete]
+  - resource: inquiries
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete, respond]
+  - resource: keys
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: artifacts
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: workflows
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: webhooks
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: analytics
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: history
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: identities
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete]
+  - resource: permissions
+    actions: [read, create, update, delete, manage]

packs/core/permission_sets/editor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+ref: core.editor
+label: Editor
+description: Create and update operational resources without full administrative control.
+grants:
+  - resource: packs
+    actions: [read, create, update]
+  - resource: actions
+    actions: [read, create, update, execute]
+  - resource: rules
+    actions: [read, create, update]
+  - resource: triggers
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: executions
+    actions: [read, create, cancel]
+  - resource: keys
+    actions: [read, update]
+  - resource: artifacts
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: workflows
+    actions: [read, create, update]
+  - resource: analytics
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: history
+    actions: [read]

packs/core/permission_sets/executor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+ref: core.executor
+label: Executor
+description: Read operational metadata and trigger executions without changing system definitions.
+grants:
+  - resource: packs
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: actions
+    actions: [read, execute]
+  - resource: rules
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: triggers
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: executions
+    actions: [read, create]
+  - resource: artifacts
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: analytics
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: history
+    actions: [read]

packs/core/permission_sets/viewer.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+ref: core.viewer
+label: Viewer
+description: Read-only access to operational metadata and execution visibility.
+grants:
+  - resource: packs
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: actions
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: rules
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: triggers
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: executions
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: artifacts
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: analytics
+    actions: [read]
+  - resource: history
+    actions: [read]

packs/core/runtimes/shell.yaml

@@ -32,3 +32,7 @@ execution_config:
     binary: "/bin/bash"
     args: []
     file_extension: ".sh"
+  inline_execution:
+    strategy: temp_file
+    extension: ".sh"
+    inject_shell_helpers: true

scripts/load_core_pack.py

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 Pack Loader for Attune
 
 This script loads a pack from the filesystem into the database.
-It reads pack.yaml, action definitions, trigger definitions, and sensor definitions
+It reads pack.yaml, permission set definitions, action definitions, trigger
-and creates all necessary database entries.
+definitions, and sensor definitions and creates all necessary database entries.
 
 Usage:
     python3 scripts/load_core_pack.py [--database-url URL] [--pack-dir DIR] [--pack-name NAME]
@@ -147,6 +147,70 @@ class PackLoader:
         print(f"✓ Pack '{ref}' loaded (ID: {self.pack_id})")
         return self.pack_id
 
+    def upsert_permission_sets(self) -> Dict[str, int]:
+        """Load permission set definitions from permission_sets/*.yaml."""
+        print("\n→ Loading permission sets...")
+
+        permission_sets_dir = self.pack_dir / "permission_sets"
+        if not permission_sets_dir.exists():
+            print("  No permission_sets directory found")
+            return {}
+
+        permission_set_ids = {}
+        cursor = self.conn.cursor()
+
+        for yaml_file in sorted(permission_sets_dir.glob("*.yaml")):
+            permission_set_data = self.load_yaml(yaml_file)
+            if not permission_set_data:
+                continue
+
+            ref = permission_set_data.get("ref")
+            if not ref:
+                print(
+                    f"  ⚠ Permission set YAML {yaml_file.name} missing 'ref' field, skipping"
+                )
+                continue
+
+            label = permission_set_data.get("label")
+            description = permission_set_data.get("description")
+            grants = permission_set_data.get("grants", [])
+
+            if not isinstance(grants, list):
+                print(
+                    f"  ⚠ Permission set '{ref}' has non-array grants, skipping"
+                )
+                continue
+
+            cursor.execute(
+                """
+                INSERT INTO permission_set (
+                    ref, pack, pack_ref, label, description, grants
+                )
+                VALUES (%s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s)
+                ON CONFLICT (ref) DO UPDATE SET
+                    label = EXCLUDED.label,
+                    description = EXCLUDED.description,
+                    grants = EXCLUDED.grants,
+                    updated = NOW()
+                RETURNING id
+            """,
+                (
+                    ref,
+                    self.pack_id,
+                    self.pack_ref,
+                    label,
+                    description,
+                    json.dumps(grants),
+                ),
+            )
+
+            permission_set_id = cursor.fetchone()[0]
+            permission_set_ids[ref] = permission_set_id
+            print(f"  ✓ Permission set '{ref}' (ID: {permission_set_id})")
+
+        cursor.close()
+        return permission_set_ids
+
     def upsert_triggers(self) -> Dict[str, int]:
         """Load trigger definitions"""
         print("\n→ Loading triggers...")
@@ -708,11 +772,12 @@ class PackLoader:
         """Main loading process.
 
         Components are loaded in dependency order:
-        1. Runtimes (no dependencies)
+        1. Permission sets (no dependencies)
-        2. Triggers (no dependencies)
+        2. Runtimes (no dependencies)
-        3. Actions (depend on runtime; workflow actions also create
+        3. Triggers (no dependencies)
+        4. Actions (depend on runtime; workflow actions also create
            workflow_definition records)
-        4. Sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
+        5. Sensors (depend on triggers and runtime)
         """
         print("=" * 60)
         print(f"Pack Loader - {self.pack_name}")
@@ -727,7 +792,10 @@ class PackLoader:
             # Load pack metadata
             self.upsert_pack()
 
-            # Load runtimes first (actions and sensors depend on them)
+            # Load permission sets first (authorization metadata)
+            permission_set_ids = self.upsert_permission_sets()
+
+            # Load runtimes (actions and sensors depend on them)
             runtime_ids = self.upsert_runtimes()
 
             # Load triggers
@@ -746,6 +814,7 @@ class PackLoader:
             print(f"✓ Pack '{self.pack_name}' loaded successfully!")
             print("=" * 60)
             print(f"  Pack ID: {self.pack_id}")
+            print(f"  Permission sets: {len(permission_set_ids)}")
             print(f"  Runtimes: {len(set(runtime_ids.values()))}")
             print(f"  Triggers: {len(trigger_ids)}")
             print(f"  Actions: {len(action_ids)}")